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THE ORIGINS OF LAW REFORM: THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
EARLY MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS*
INTRODUCTION: CONCERNING THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

OF THE MOVEMENT To CODIFY PRIVATE LAW

Codification of private law has been part of the traditions of Western civilization for more than 2,000 years. Based on a Romanist tradition, the first modern code was enacted in France in 1804. The social
significance of this modernization of Roman law has been demonstrated by a scholar of the historic relationship between codification
and the evolution of modern societies.
The unification of law by codification was an answer to the need for

equality. Previously, the various social groups (e.g., clergy, nobility,
commoners) were not subjected to the same legal rules, and the law
was different for each category of individuals. E.g., the nobility referred to feudal law for determination of personal status, inheritance
and the law of goods, whereas the common people had to refer to
local customs for a determination of these same matters. One of the
consequences of unification of law through codification is the creation

of a law common to everyone and as a result, equality for all without
reference to social status. Thus codification can be viewed as part of
the whole historical movement which gradually transformed societies
whose structures had been based on social hierarchy and inequality
into societies based on democracy and equality.'

After the French Revolution the French Civil Code became the model
of most modern, commercial states. The Anglo-American legal system
stands conspicuously outside this generalization. Nevertheless a codification movement did emerge as a consequence of the American Revolution. This movement derives its importance from the significance
of codification itself which has been described by Mitchell Franklin,
an eminent legal scholar, as
[a cry] to heaven that legal history is not the story of inexorable, unCopyright © 1975 by Peggy A. Rabkin.
1. Maillet, The Historic Significance of French Codification, 44 TUL. L.
681, 687 (1970).
*
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controllable forces which cannot be tampered with, and that it is not
an account of slow-working, vacillating forces which should not be
2
accelerated.

Codification is not merely important for its revision of content; its
methodology of analogizing from the code text rather than from past
cases, is crucial to future legal development. As Franklin has pointed
out:
[L]egislation even in a century-old code usually represents a more

modem adjustment of social interests than the case law, in which even
older historical elements are necessarily predominant.8

Franklin explained why this result obtains. He argued that a great defect exists in the common-law method because it is
a system in which private persons assert in private litigation their own
claims without knowing or revealing fully the social interests involved
and their adjustments; interests which, however, stand revealed in
learned discussion, based on all resources, "factual" and otherwise,
available in the draughting of codes. It is not enough to say that the
subject matter of law is social interests. The adjustment of these social interests must also be a socialized process, and not be left to the
4
mercy of the individualism of mere judicial litigation.

As Professor Franklin has demonstrated, a "society based on political organization and anxious to direct its own future can insist on
nothing less" than codification of its civil law.6 Yet the United States
has no civil code. Moreover, it has forgotten the history of its codification movement. A recent article by Morton J. Horwitz, Harvard's
young legal historian, has shed some light on the reasons why this
important movement has been slighted by prior legal historiography.
Horwitz attributed to Roscoe Pound hegemony over the content and
values of 19th century legal historiography. One of Pound's themes,
according to Horwitz, was "the happy and glorious triumph of the
common law over the post-revolutionary Francophiles and Anglophobes and then, in a repeat performance, over their successors, the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
tory, 17

Franklin, Book Review, 7 TUL. L. Rav. 632, 633 (1933).
Id. at 637
Id. at 638.
Id.
Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal HisAm. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973).

CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
codifiers of the 1830's and 1840's." 7 If this is true, Pound's triumph

is regrettable, because as Horwitz has explained, "[c]odification was
democratic lawmaking" while "[t]he rule of the common law maintained the separation between law and politics" and "enabled the legal
profession to control the scope and form of legal change." 8 Moreover,
codification "conferred the primary law making power on an untutored populace."
Pound was a part of a larger tendency characterized by Horwitz
as the tradition of "lawyer's legal history" the thrust of which is "to
prevent the real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role
of justifying the world as it is."'L Horwitz explained how this perversion
is effected:
[H]istory must be ransacked in order to sing hosannas to all of the
existing pieties of professionalization. Thus it must be that the common law tradition-the ultimate expression of the domination of the
legal profession in the legal order-must be applauded. Its historical
antagonist, the codification movement, is dismissed either as the political goal of a lunatic fringe led by a demagogic leader or, when all
else is lost, as an unwholesome and untrustworthy democratic force.
This last theme, of course, is dependent on first establishing a conception of law as essentially apolitical and scientific in character,
which is indispensable for a forthright7 attack on the Codification
Movement as democratic. 1

Horwitz's biting conclusion must be reckoned with.
However much the history of law is written in terms of internal
criteria established by the legal profession, it is forced to evaluate
those explicit political movements for legal change originating outside
of the profession. In modem democratic societies, these movements
have often involved attacks on the special claims of the legal profession to hold itself out as the professors of a mysterious science
involving forms of reasoning and access to knowledge unavailable to
ordinary men. And so long as the historian adopts the categories of
the profession, he will be driven to denounce these movements as
"demagogic." The result is that an elitist and anti-democratic politics
12
pervades most of the traditional writings on American legal history.
7. Id. at 276.
8. Id. at 278.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 281.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 283.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

The thesis of the following article is that the American codification movement sought, among other things, to defeudalize the law
of property in order that it conform to a commercial economy, and that
this movement to reform property law had ramifications in other
branches of law as well. One such area was the law of married women's
property. Even after the American Revolution, married women's legal
status was partly feudal. By the mid-19th century it was modernized
in New York State by the passage of a series of Married Women's
Property Acts. Between the Revolution and New York's first Married
Women's Property Act of 1848 there developed a strong codification
movement. It will be demonstrated that this law reform movement,
not only preceded the women's rights movement by several decades,
but also helped to inaugurate the later movement. Although the codification movement failed in its efforts to revolutionize legal method, it
was influential in modernizing legal content. The codification movement demonstrated the efficiency of law reform through legislation
when massive changes in legal content are called for and left as part
of its legacy radical changes in the law of married women which both
prepared the way for the 19th century women's rights movement and
illustrated to feminists what ought to be changed and how to do it.
Although 19th century America was by no means a feudal state,
there existed certain feudal vestiges in the legal system. There were
several possible methods to defeudalize the law. One was by the use
of common-law fictions. Another was the mitigation of strict law by
equity. The third was through legislation. The first method was itself
feudal, and was therefore rejected. The second method had a history
of adjusting the content of law, but its method of judicial legislation
was similarly rejected by those who sought radical revision of legal
content. Therefore, American law reformers opted for "scientific" or
systematic law reform through legislation. These reformers were influenced by the same Romanist and Enlightenment thought which had
inspired the French Civil Code. In New York State, the Francophile
reformers revised the old feudal property laws with an aim toward
making land into an item of commerce. One aspect of property law
which was part of this revision was a law granting to married women
the right to own property. Once women had the right to own property,
they demanded the right to protect that property. This demand was
manifested in the movement for women's suffrage.

CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
I.

TiE STATUS OF MARRIED WOMEN AT COMMON LAw:
FEUDAL VESTIGES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS

Before 1848 the legal status of married women in New York State
was bifurcated. There was one status for married women at common
law and another in equity. At common law the husband and wife
were regarded as one person and marriage resulted in the "civil death"
of the woman. 13 Out of this fictional "unity" and "death" arose all of
the common-law disabilities of married women.14 The disabilities were
harsh, but their impact was mitigated by the fact that they did not
extend to her equitable separate estate and obligations arising from
this separate estate.1 5
Under the common law a married woman was unable to contract with her husband' or with third parties.' 7 Similarly she could
not convey real or personal property to or from her husband nor acquire or dispose of property from third persons without her husband's
consent. 18 Since a married woman was unable to contract or convey,
it followed that she could not at law engage in trade or business, 9
nor sue or be sued without joinder of her husband.2 0 However, a
wife could engage in trade if she had the consent of her husband for
such consent implied authority for her to contract debts in conducting such trade or business. 2 ' Also at common law, as a consequence
of the fiction of unity, the marriage of a male debtor to his female
creditor extinguished the ante-nuptial debt.22 The theory underlying
these rules was the fictional unity of husband and wife into one
person.
Complementing the wife's disabilities was correspondingly increased legal capacity for the husband at common law. Within the
feudal hierarchy each had his status. The common law expressed these
social statuses. At common law the husband had -thestatus of head and
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See, e.g., Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299 (1882).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
See, e.g., Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462, 84 N.E. 382 (1908).
See, e.g., Dickerson v. Rogers, 114 N.Y. 405, 21 N.E. 992 (1889).
See, e.g., Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N.Y. 27 (1870).
See, e.g., Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 44 N.Y. 343 (1871).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
See, e.g., Cropsey v. McKinney, 30 Barb. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
Power v. Lester, 23 N.Y. 527, 529 (1861).
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master of his household. A wife was required to render obedience,
domestic service and submission to her husband-duties analogous to
the relation of a vassal to his lord.23 Feudal law incorporated these
status relationships into its law of real property. Ultimate ownership
of the land was in the King. Interests in land were parcelled out in
exchange for loyalty and military service upon demand. All land had
to be held by one who was capable of rendering such services.
The principle of seisin facilitated the operation of the feudal system. Seisin meant possession of the land with an intent of holding a
freehold interest in exchange for the performance of homage and
fealty. To facilitate this system of land-holding in exchange for military protection, it was necessary for the land to be possessed or seized
by a male. For this reason, the common law gave a husband a freehold estate in real property held by his wife. The common law provided for such transfer of ownership so that the seisin would be in a
male who could perform the feudal military duties. Whether the
wife's interest arose before or after marriage, the husband was thus entitled to the possession, use and income of her estate 24 for the duration
of the marriage and their joint lives. 25 Pursuant to this right to possession, the husband could obligate the property by contract for the
duration of his estate 26 or could grant, convey or mortgage this interest. 27 If issue were born, the husband, at common law, became
entitled to tenancy of a deceased wife's land for the rest of his life;
if there were no issue, the husband's interest in his wife's estate ended
28
with her death.
Personal property of a wife was treated similarly to real prop29
erty, despite the fact that there existed no corresponding military
necessity. Thus all personal property owned by the wife prior to
marriage vested absolutely in the husband as did any property acquired by her after marriage.30 Likewise, the husband was entitled to
the choses in action of the wife if he reduced them to possession sub23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17 (1883).
Hilesv. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306 (1895).
See, e.g., Bradley v. Walker, 138 N.Y. 291, 33 N.E. 1079 (1893).
Id.
See, e.g., Jones v. Patterson, 11 Barb. 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
Id.
See, e.g., De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 772 (1911).
See, e.g., Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299 (1882).
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ject to the jurisdiction of a court which insured that he provide for
her under the doctrine of settlement for the wife's equity.31 This doctrine compelled the husband to make a suitable provision for his
wife.
The common-law relationship between husband and wife had
ramifications for relationships with third parties. At common law the
husband was responsible for all debts of the wife which she contracted
with third parties 32 even if these obligations were incurred prior to
marriage.3 3 Because of the wife's incapacity to be sued without joinder
of her husband, at common law, a husband was jointly liable for her
tortious acts towards third parties whether committed by her before or
after marriage. If the wife's tort were committed in the presence of
the husband or by the husband and wife jointly the common law
held the husband alone liable.3 4 Incident to these principles, the common law held the husbands' estate jure uxoris, and the real property
of his wife was liable for his debts.3 5 Since he also owned absolutely
his wife's personal property, that property was also liable.36 Even a
wife's paraphernalia, or her apparel and ornaments, could be claimed
by her husband's creditors after his death.3
The disabilities incident to the legal status of women at common
law were particularly debilitating in a commercial society. The common law had evolved to meet the needs of a feudal society, in which
one's legal status was in effect an expression of a property relationship
between political superiors and inferiors within the feudal hierarchy.
The reason for the system was military necessity in a landed economy.
When the reason for a rule ceases to exist, the rule becomes irrational. The irrationality of the common law status of married women
became increasingly cldear as the economy became more commercial.
The first inroads against this feudal legal status were made through
equity. Further changes by legislation were to be extensions of equity
principles. Therefore an examination of married women's legal status
under equity is worthwhile at this juncture.
31.
32.
34.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
See, e.g., Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N.Y. 212, 26 N.E. 611 (1891).
See, e.g., Lennon v. Eldred, 65 Barb. 410 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873).
Vanneman v. Powers, 56 N.Y. 39 (1874).
See, e.g., Van Duzer v. Van Duzer, 6 Paige 366 (Ch. 1837).
See, e.g., Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
See, e.g., Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299 (1882).
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II.

INITIAL INROADS THROUGH EQUITY AGAINST
THE FEUDAL SOCIAL STATUS

OF WOMEN

A. The Role of Equity in Law Reform-In General
Sir Henry Maine, a 19th century legal historian and scholar of
comparative law, wrote Ancient Law38 in 1861. This classic of legal
literature was written from the point of view of the historical school
of jurisprudence. Maine's thesis was that societies progress in historical
sequence through periods of legal development. These periods Maine
characterized as dominated by legal fiction, equity and legislation
which are instrumentalities of legal change. Law reform through legal
fiction, equity and legislation, Maine contended, culminated in a
steady advancement from status to contract in private legal relationships.3 91 Status was a feudal concept and contract was a bourgeois
device.
Although the absolute accuracy of Maine's thesis, especially
his view of 19th century contract law as the pinnacle of historical
development, is open to question, 40 his study of Roman equity remains
viable. According to Maine, the Romans had a dual conception of law.
First there was the civil law, or the law which a people enact. Secondly, there was that law which natural reason appoints for all mankind. This was called the law of nations because all nationals were
subject to its jurisdiction. Its rules were to be dictated by the principles of equity expounded by the Praetor.41 The Praetor stood in
Roman law midway between the juris consuls and the legislature.

That is to say, this official had a limited right to reform the law. His
function was to determine in what cases the letter of the law was to
give way to natural justice or equity. Such discretion was limited by
public opinion for he was viewed as the keeper of the conscience of
the Roman people. If he did not exercise his discretion to modify the
law within the conscience of the people, he was subject to dismissal
from office.4
38. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Beacon Paper ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as ANCIENT LAW].

39. Id. passim.
40. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 217 (5th ed. 1967); C. FRIEDRICH,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 141 (2d ed. 1963).
41. ANCIENT LAW 44.

42. See id. at 54.
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The function of this law of nature and, thus of equity, was to
maintain legal jurisdiction over commercial relations with foreigners
who were excluded from Roman civil law. 43 This inclusion of foreigners within a legal system helped maintain domestic tranquility by
insuring that dispute settlement would have a peaceful alternative
to armed conflict. The substance of this law of nature was defined
by those elements of the various foreign people's civil laws which
were common to "all the nations," that is, to a large number of separate races. 44 Maine traced the ideas of this jurisprudence to Greek
Stoic philosophers. 45 In line with this philosophy, the Praetor issued
edicts to restore technical legal anomalies to the way nature had
46
governed man in his primitive state.
Maine proposed that the law of nations and the law of nature
"touch and blend through Aequitas or Equity. '47 This result obtained because the Roman juris consuls, in order to justify the improvement of their jurisprudence by the Praetor, utilized the Greek
doctrine of a "Natural state of man-a Natural society-anterior to
the organization of commonwealths governed by positive laws. ' 48
Mitchell Franklin described this bifurication of equity as "positive" and "negative." 49 Both aspects of equity have a role to play in
law reform. Negative equity contradicts the existing law in the name
of a higher law, what Aristotle would call correct justice. Only after
negative equity has done its job, does positive equity come into play.
Positive equity regards the work done by negative equity as a "fresh
starting point" from which "it rectifies, by extension (analogy) the
existing law," and "by excluding overthrown, archaic and archaistic
legal conceptions when they present themselves unexpectedly for recognition, as well as to deepen or to advance the new policies into
new and unanticipated situations." 50
Following this model, it can be said that equity as an instrument
of legal change first acted negatively to block the strict feudal com43. Id. at 44-46.
44. Id. at 47.
45. Id. at 53.

46. Id. at 54.
47. Id. at 55.

48. Id. at 68.
49. Franklin, A New Conception of the Relation Between Law and Equity, 11
PHIL. & PHENOMENOL.

REs. 474 (1951).

50. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Methodology and its Implications
for Republican Form of Government, 40 TUL. L. REV. 455, 494 (1966).
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mon law which did not allow a married woman to own property. It
did this by developing the trust and by the doctrine, in equity, of
a married woman's separate estate. After this doctrine was developed,
equity could be used positively. If a married woman is able to hold
a separate estate, by analogy or extension, she should be able to contract with respect to that estate. Both Franklin and Maine agree that
the next stage of law reform is codification of equity by the legislature.r" The Married Women's Property Acts were such a codification
of equity.
B. The Role of Equity in the Reform of Married Women's Property
Before the 1848 Married Women's Property Act was passed in
New York State, the common-law disabilities of married women were
mitigated by equity which allowed a married woman an equitable
separate estate. 52 Equity courts also provided for a married woman
through a doctrine which created a right to a suitable allowance or
settlement from her choses in action, interests in a decedent's estate,
and other personalty which at common law became the property of
her husband when he reduced them to his possession.53 The equitable
doctrine of a married woman's separate estate was developed to correct
the injustice and mitigate the hardship incident to the common-law
merger of the legal beings of husband and wife.5 4 Under this doctrine
of a married woman's equitable separate estate, property could be
set aside for the separate use of a married woman, and if this were
done, she was not burdened with common-law disabilities with respect to this property. 55 In such property the married woman had an
equitable title while another person had the legal title. This other
person was a trustee who was under a fiduciary duty to use the property for her benefit alone. This duty was enforced by Chancery. If
not restrained by the terms of the trust instrument, the beneficiary,
or married woman, could act as a feme sole, or single woman, in the
disposition of the equitable separate estate by sale, gift or devise.50
Moreover, the married woman, and not her husband, was entitled to
51. Franklin, Some Considerations on the Existential Force of Roman Law in the
Early History of the United States, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 69, 79 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).

53.
54.
55.
56.

See, e.g., Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 1 N.Y. 473 (1848).
See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
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the sale, exclusive use, rents, issues and profits of this equitable separate estate.5 7 Such an equitable estate could be established by the husband himself who would voluntarily divest himself of his wife's estate
and hold it as trustee for her separate use or beneficial enjoyment.5 8
A wife's separate estate could also arise by a conveyance from a third
person directly to the married woman for her sole and separate use. 59
A major advantage of the equitable mitigation of the strict common law was that a husband could not be compelled by equity to reduce his wife's choses in action to his possession in order to pay his
creditors,6 0 and a wife's separate equitable estate,"' as well as any
property settled on her by equity for support of herself and family,
was similarly secure from her husband's creditors. 62 Instead, the wife
herself was free to encumber her separate estate as long as she was
not specifically restrained by the terms of the trust instrument.p
Moreover, a contract of a wife with her husband could be enforced
by equity to the extent that repayment of a loan could be made out
of the wife's separate property, 4 and the repayment of a loan made by
a wife to her husband out of her separate property was enforceable
in equity.65 In such a case, the wife's title to money or property received from such loan was good as against the creditors of her
husband. 6
Incident to equity's disregard of the fictional unity of husband
and wife, courts of this branch of jurisprudence gave full effect to
transactions or contracts between husband and wife where they were
fair and just. 61 Likewise, pursuant to the disavowance of this common-

law fiction, each spouse could sue or be sued by the other.6 Moreover,
equity recognized the validity of contracts with third persons if they
were for the benefit of, or were a charge upon, the wife's estate, and
if they did not conflict with the trust instrument.6 9
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 1 N.Y. 473 (1848).
See, e.g., Ryder v. Hulse, 24 N.Y. 372 (1862).
See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
See, e.g., Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige 361 (1841).
See, e.g., Smith v. Kane, 2 Paige 302 (1830).
See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
See, e.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526 (Sup. Ct. 1839).
See, e.g., Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298 (1871).

66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N.Y. 411, 22 N.E. 1029 (1889).
68. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 47 N.Y. 467 (1872).
69. See, e.g., Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
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Thus, equity had significantly modified the strict law of married
women's property. Yet, the Married Women's Property Acts of 1848
and 1849 were passed to codify this law. The question then is, if equity
so operated, why were such acts needed. The answer involves the limitations of equity as a method of law reform. Equity was judge-made
law. Its source was not in the people, but in the Crown. Since American law reformers were Anglophobes as well as Francophiles, a system
of law reform which was founded on judicial discretion emanating
from the King's prerogative was destined to be challenged despite
positive inroads made against a feudal content. In fact, the struggle
against the prerogative powers of Chancery had a history long antedating the American Revolution.
III.

THE IDEOLOGY OF LAW REFORM THROUGH LEGISLATION

Roscoe Pound in his important work, The Formative Era of
American Law, 70 once posed the rhetorical question, "What did legis-

lation achieve for American law in the height of legislative leadership
from the Revolution to the Civil War?" 71 He answered:
For the most part it did away with survivals in seventeenth-century
English law which had not been eliminated in the wake of the Puritan
Revolution, and for the rest formulated what jurists of the school
of natural law and courts of equity had worked out and made ready
for legislative adoption. . . . It abrogated rules and institutions
which had come down from feudal England. It pruned away restrictions on free individual activity which spoke from the relationally
organized society of the Middle Ages and had ceased to be applicable to a society organized on the basis of free individual competitive
self-assertion. What it reshaped, as for example in the Married
Women's Acts, was mostly reshaped to the patterns laid out by
equity.72
If the legislative reform movement brought the acts which set
off the women's rights movement, it becomes important to examine

the law reform movement in some depth. This can best be accomplished by first scrutinizing the ideas of the movement's theoreticians
and then the changes in the law which resulted from their activities.
70. R. POUND, THE
as FORMATIVE ERA].
71. Id. at 42.
72. Id. at 43.

FORMATIVE

ERA

OF AMERICAN

LAW (1938) [hereinafter cited
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The goal of the movement's leaders was defeudalization through legislation. Because their goal was antifeudal, they felt that the common
law, which was feudal in method, should not be the instrument to
modernize the content of law. In fact, the bench and bar feared the
impact of defeudalization-demystification of the legal system-with
a resulting threat to their vocational existence.7 3 Moreover, because
the accepted idea after the Revolution was that the source of law was
in the people, defeudalization had to come from the legislature and
not the prerogative court of Chancery.
A. The Contributionsof Jeremy Bentham
The intellectual roots of legislative supremacy can be traced in
part to the Puritan Revolution and in part to the French Enlightenment. These sources merge in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham has been acknowledged to be the first proponent of the idea
of legislation as a scientific method of law reform in the Anglo-American world. 74 Intending to eradicate the evils of judge-made law, his
theme was double-edged-simultaneously to attack judicial discretion and advance the theory of scientific law reform. To Bentham
"discretion of a judge" and "common law" were interchangeable
expressions.7 5 The method he advanced as an alternative to the common law consisted of replacing it with codified law. 76 Bentham believed that what was called legal reasoning was in fact judicial lawmaking. Thig lawmaking occurs when law becomes outmoded and
the judge, while deciding a case, perceives the anachronism. In order
to mitigate the harsh effect of the outmoded rule, the judge uses fic-tions. To Bentham such "reasoning" was illegitimate and not truly
law.7 7 He characterized fictions as an assumption of arbitrary power
73. W. BUTLER, THE REVISION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
AND THE REVISERS 20-21 (1889) [hereinafter cited as REVISION & REVISERS]; S. PRALL,
THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1640-1660, at
67, 145-58 (1966). Note also that James Carter, the man who was most active in the
campaign to defeat the civil code of David Dudley Field, was commissioned to do so by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
74. See, e.g., 2 H. BROUGHAM, SPEECHES 287-88 (1838); H. STANTON, SKETCHES
OF REFORMS AND REFORMERS 87, 95 (1849) [hereinafter cited as REFORMS AND REFORMERS]; FORmATiVE ERA
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and a stealing of legislative power by the judiciary. Thus, fictions were
a politically dangerous weapon in Bentham's eyes. By the use of this
technique of "willful falsehood," judges, Bentham explained, could
usurp this power openly, since the delusion produced by the fiction
prevents the usurpation of power from being made lucid and more
78
easily thwarted.
To Bentham, one of the most dreadful of all fictions was the
"fictitious person ... called the common law.1 7 His dread stemmed
from his conception of the nature of law. As a positivist, he believed
law was a command. For law to be legitimate, therefore, it must be a
command from a legitimate source of power and it must not be ad hoc
or ex post facto. The legitimate source of the command is the legislature which represents the people and the proper form of the command is a formulated statute the point of which is sufficiently visible.80
Since the judge is not a legislator himself, and would not admit to
being one, Bentham believed, he creates a fictitious legislator called
the common law in order to disguise the fact that the command he
issues with -every decision is actually his own decree.8 1 This procedure
Bentham characterized as "sham law" and, therefore, illegitimate
despite the pretext offered to justify it: "that it is but a copy of a
proposition . . . delivered on some former occasion by some other
82
judge."
Bentham's hostility toward the common law was aroused because
it manifested three truly discretionary and arbitrary features: (1)
uncertainty,8 3 (2) an ex post facto character,8 4 and (3) unknowability
by the common people who, nevertheless, are subject to the presumption that they know the law.88 He described it as "law which is uncertain in its essence-law without beginning and without end-law
by which animals are governed. . . disgraceful to men."8' 0 He equated
a judge making common law to a man making law for his dog:
When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make

laws87for your dog: and this is the way judges make laws for you and

me.

In the place of this ex post facto and illegitimate common law,
Bentham proposed a complete code written as clearly and simply as
possible.88 He felt that "whatever is not in the code of Laws, ought
not to be a law. Nothing ought to be referred either to custom, or to
foreign law, or to pretended natural law, or to pretended law of
nations."8 9 Thus, this attack would also apply to equity as a method
of law reform since, as Maine explained, equity's source was in the
law of nations.
Although Bentham insisted on a complete and written law, he did
acknowledge that it was not possible for the legislator to foresee each
and every case which could ariseY0 Nevertheless, Bentham maintained
that it was possible to codify every "species" of cases which might
occur. 91 In this way the codification comes "before events instead of
following them." 92 Thus, because the general principles of behavior
are recorded prior to the facts, and because the source of those principles are in the representative legislature, the code and decisions based
on it is legitimate.
The role of the judge as interpreter of the code was narrowly defined by Bentham. The introduction of any unwritten, that is,
judge-made law should be strictly forbidden. According to Bentham's
blueprint:
If a new case occur, not provided for by the code, the judge may
point it out, and indicate the remedy; but no decision of any judge,
much less the opinion of any individual, should be allowed to be
cited as law, until such 93decision or opinion have been embodied by
the legislator in the code.

Thus, Bentham was adverse to having stare decisis applied to the
code. He stated that:
If any commentary should be written on this code ... all men should
87. 5 id. at 235.
88. 3 id. at 205-10.
89. Id. at 205.
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be required to pay no regard to such comment; neither should it be
allowed to be cited in any court of justice in any manner whatsoever,
4
neither by express words, nor by any circuitous designation.
The judge's function, under Bentham's plan, is never to tell what he
thinks the code means, but only what the "legislator had in view and
5
and do this with "as
intended to express, but failed to express"
90
the substance of the
If
possible."
as
comment
or
little explanation
law required revision, the legislature should do it at least every 100
years. This, Bentham hoped, would keep the terms and expressions
from becoming obsolete and too remote from the common people
97
who should always have a cognizable code.
B. The Contributionsof William Sampson
The Enlightenment's influence on the codification movement can
also be seen in the work of William Sampson. He was a rebellious Irish
Jacobean lawyer who wrote extensively in The Northern Star, a biweekly newspaper founded in Belfast in 1792 to spread the reform ideas
of the French and American Revolutions. 98 Viewing legal obscurity as
a major threat to popular government, his theme became the interrelation of legal demystification and democracy. In a 1794 satire,
widely read on both sides of the Atlantic, he demonstrated the harsh
consequences of criminal laws which both the accused and the jury
could not know or understand. He portrayed a trial in which a hurdygurdy was charged with criminal libel for playing the politically inflammatory "ga Ira."'9 9 The jury was exposed to the mystification
caused by procedural formalities and injustice resulted.
Sampson was most important in demonstrating that the ambiguity
of law could be utilized as a political weapon. His satire effectively
showed the way the ambiguous principles of the oral common law
could be transformed, shifted or veered at the discretion of the judge
who thereby gained the power of a legislator while in the office of a
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers, 11 Ai. J.
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jurist. Just as the strict law could be mitigated in the name of equity
or justice, the law can also be intensified by a politically partisan
judge.
The evils of judicial legislation were seen with particular clarity
in times of political dissent. The rebellion in Ireland probably
sharpened Sampson's perceptions. His work was more activist and
less theoretical than Bentham's. Sampson acted as attorney for those
dissenters accused of libel, sedition and treason. Soon he was branded
a rebel himself and forced into exile, a status destined to bring him
to New York State. Prior to his arrival in America he was a refugee
in France. While there he became familiar with the French Civil
Code and the jurists who supported it. In the code system Sampson
saw an answer to the problems of the ambiguities and uncertainties
inherent in a system of judicial precedent. 100
Sampson arrived in New York in 1806 and was admitted to the
bar. While in America he waged a constant campaign for a national
code, both through pamphlets' 0 1 and in arguments before courts on
behalf of his clients. 10 2 His ideal national code was to originate in
the legislature which represented the people. The code was to replace
precedent as the source of a decision before a court. Judicial lawmaking was to be ended by this code because reliance on stare decisis,
Sampson felt, could only result in arbitrary and highly personal results.
Sampson's arguments in support of this new system reflected an
Enlightenment optimism, a desire to make the American Revolution,
the Enlightenment's political expression, complete, and an intense
Anglophobia. 10 3 His Anniversary Discourse'°4 delivered before the Historical Society of New York in 1823 exemplified his arguments and
the ideas behind them. In an expression of undaunted, almost religious,
faith in "natural reason," science and progress, he attacked the com100. Id. at 238.
101. See, e.g., W.
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100
mon law for being a "pagan idol,"'0 5 a "mysterious essence"' and an
"antique altar . . .worshipped by ignorants and superstitious votaries."' 07 As such it embodied "artificial reason"' 08 or "Judicial astrology"' 9 not suited to the realities of the new scientific age. 110 The
common law, he argued, was developed for barbarians in a time of
universal darkness.11 Sampson, was advancing the interests of a new
commercial bourgeoisie, when he argued for a code of "written
reason" 112 needed for an age of commerce, science and progress. 1" 3
For Sampson, the American Revolution meant the end of feudalism, with its corollary aristocratic privilege, and the beginning of
democracy. As a warm supporter of the Revolution, he sought the
demise of the common law which he regarded as a pre-revolutionary
atavism. He advocated the codification of the new nation's private
law as the way to making the post-revolutionary legal system into "a
model of judicial polity equal to that already exhibited in our political institutions."": 4 Until the common law was replaced by a code,
he argued, Americans would be "still dragging at their heels the fragments of their broken chains.""15
Sampson, in advancing his position, was always ready to "twist
the lion's tail." He argued that the common law was "made for us"
rather than "by us" and by a foreign people." 6 As such, it was
imported law,"17 unsuited to "our own independent condition."1"" Its
feudal rules and procedures would not do for a commercial state." 9
He hoped that with codification we would no longer import this for-

eign law since "English judges . . . are not fit persons to legislate for

us.'

20
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and he is the fountain of their justice."' 121 Thus, the law made
by these judges should not become the basis of American law.
Sampson's plan was to discard English reports as "rubbish" and
to replace them with an unambiguous, regulated and systematized
form of American substantive law supplemented with a plainly and
intelligibly written statement of the general principles and standards
on which they ought to depend. Stare decisis would be replaced by
these general standards in order that:
Particular cases will not then be resorted to instead of general law.
The law will govern the decisions of judges, and not the decisions
of the law. Judgments will be ligibus non exemplis. And it will not
be necessary that at least one victim should be sacrificed to the making of every new rule, which without such immolation would have
no existence.122
Thus, Sampson aimed to eliminate judicial lawmaking and its conseqent evil, ex post facto uncertainty.
Sampson, like Bentham, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy
of legal fictions as a method of law reform. He claimed that his method
would also end the system of judicial lawmaking through fictions, as
a result of which litigants are subjected to "precedents composed before the party was in being, and which, in no one single instance,
conform to the truth: insomuch, that he who dares to tell his case
according to the simple and honest truth, will for that very reason, if
123
for no other, fail in his suit."'

Sampson's Discourse was widely reported in contemporary newspaper and periodicals. 2 4 This and other articles and correspondence
by him intensified the popular interest in law reform. 25 One result of
this increased interest was the commissioning of those who were to
revise New York's statutes. 26
C. The Contributionsof James Humphreys
In part two of his work, Observations on the Actual State of the
121.
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English Laws of Real Property,127 James Humphreys, a prominent
19th century English real estate lawyer, suggested remedies for what
he considered to be a defective state of property law. Inspired by both
Bacon's scientific method and the French Civil Code, he advocated
framing an entire system of the laws of real property. 12 Humphreys,
like Bentham, was hostile to fictions and, like David Dudley Field,
hostile to two separate jurisdictions (law and equity) for distinct
modification of the same property. 129 Humphreys' attack was against
the feudal common law, but neither did he accept equitable solutions
to the problem of law reform. As he put it:
The three great causes to which I would attribute the redundancy
of these laws are:-l. The technicalities of tenure in general, with
the entire mass of customary tenures; 2. Uses and 3. Equitable interference, comprising passive and constructive trusts, with the various
other instances and the peculiar rules of this interposition ....130
Humphreys' hostility toward equity as a means of law reform stemmed
from a hostility toward both its origin and the reason for its survival.
He disliked uses because they were introduced into the law "by churchmen for sinister purposes."' 3 ' Churchmen could circumvent their
vows of poverty through the use which allowed them an equitable
interest while legal title was in another. The reason for the continuance of uses and for the development and retention of passive and
constructive trusts was that they were successful modes to avoid the
intractableness of feudal tenures.1s2 Yet to Humphreys, a trust was
merely another fiction by which equity judges assumed the functions
of a legislature. 33 His plan called for the removal of the tenures and,
therefore, the removal of the need for equitable remedies.134
Humphreys' more specific suggestions for reform conform to the
general suggestions discussed above. If enacted, he believed they
would defeudalize and make land more easily alienated. He suggested
127. J. HUMPHREYS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE ENGLISH
LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY WITH OUTLINE FOR A SYSTEMATIC REFORM (2d ed. 1827)
[hereinafter cited as OBSERVATIONS WITH OUTLINE FOR SYSTEMiATIC REFORM].
128. Id. at 215-34.
129. Id. at 218-19.
130. Id. at 220 (emphasis in original).
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133. Id. at 229.
134. Id. at 223.
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the admission of the half blood and of the ascending line; 138 the abolition of the estate tail; 3 6 correction in the terms of executory dispositions which limit their commencement, and with it the protraction
of all power to alienate; 37 removing the influence of tenures from the
doctrine of powers; 38 extending testamentary disposition from such
land as a testator is entitled at the making of his will, to all that he
may be entitled at his death; 3 9 giving greater protection to the rights
of creditors including the abolition of copyholds; 40 the greater extent
and uniformity of laws of registration coupled with the abrogation of
equitable notice, which had half-neutralized them; 41 codifying the law
of real property into language simple enough for the general public
to know their rights; 142 modeling the new substantive law of real property on the lines of the law of personal property where there existedno
traces of tenure, uses or trusts; 4 3 and regulation of the elaborate
system founded by equity upon the conversion of land into money
and the reverse. 1 44 Humphreys' suggestions were inspired by the continental civil codes which worked especially well in the Netherlands,
45
a commercialized nation free from feudalism.
With regard to the rights of marriage, involving courtesy, dower,
and the wife's separate estate, Humphreys stated that they "require
much correction"' 4 and on "principles wholly different from those
which at present regulate them."' 47 Humphreys also observed that "the
harsh law, which gives absolutely to the husband all the wife's personal estate, of whatever magnitude, which she may become possessed
of during the intermarriage, cries feelingly for correction."' 48 Again,
equity was not the institution to which Humphreys wished to look for
a remedy. He contended:
The palliatives introduced by courts of equity, the limited oppor135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 221.
at 222.
at 223.
at 223-24.

141. Id. at 224-25.

142. Id. at 225-28.
143. Id. at 228-29.
144. Id. at 233-34.

145. Id. at 230-34.
146. Id. at 221-22.

147. Id. at 222.
148. Id. at 259 (emphasis in original).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tunities they possess of exercising their jurisdiction, their subtle refinements to drag the property within it, the fluctuation of their doctrines on the subject, and the consequent uncertainty they occasion,
combine to create an evil nearly as great as what they seek to re1 49
dress.

Consonant with this criticism of equity, Humphreys suggested that
15 0
the following article be enacted into law.
Any settlement under the preceding article [which allowed interspousal agreements, either before or after marriage respecting their
landed property] may be made upon, or the land of any person, or
the profits thereof, may be given to, the wife, for her exclusive and
inalienable enjoyment, during the actual or proposed marriage; or
where a stranger is the donor, during any future marriage. 151

Humphreys suggested this article "supersedes the necessity of trustees
for protecting the wife in what she actually enjoys at present in equity
in her own name, and might do equally so at law, by rendering her a
152
feme sole as to her separate rights."
The fictional fine was used as a device whenever a disposition was
intended of a wife's lands not settled to her separate disposal. To
avoid the necessity of using this fiction, Humphreys proposed the
following article to be considered by the legislature.
The wife may, during the marriage, dispose of or release her lands,
or her interest ... [in any settlement by her husband or a third person as allowed by Humphreys' proposed plan] either by deed, with
the written consent of her husband, or by will; but if by deed, the
same must be acknowledged by her, as her free act, before a judge
of one of his Majesty's courts of record ...or before the clerk of the
peace of the county where she shall reside; which officer shall secretly
examine her thereon; and a certificate of such examination shall be
endorsed on the instrument so acknowledged, and shall be signed by
such officer; and such certificate may be afterwards registered, pursuant to the regulations . . . [in the title proposed by Humphreys

on Registration], with the clerk of the peace of15 3the county where any
land affected by the instrument in question lies.
149.
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Although Humphreys' suggestions, which ultimately became part
of New York law, 54 were steps toward the freer alienability of land,
defeudalization and ultimately the Married Women's Property Acts,
they were not motivated by feminism. In fact his text exhibits blatant disregard for changing the law of married women. One of the
articles he proposed for his recommended system of reform provided
that: "The husband is entitled to the wife's land during their intermarriage; unless any disposition to the contrary be made ....
Although he did provide for the ability to make such "dispositions to
the contrary" by private agreement between husband and wife or with
third persons, the burden, Humphreys suggested, should be on the
private person to contract to the contrary. If no such contract is
made, the husband should retain his old feudal life interests.
Humphreys, who hated feudalism, tolerated this feudal vestige on the
spurious grounds that "any benefit arising from a change would be too
questionable to warrant the interfering with it."'15 Another feudal
vestige tolerated by Humphreys was the unequal treatment of widows
and widowers. Humphreys proposed that:
If the husband survives the wife, he is entitled as follows: viz. if she
leave issue, to a moiety of the profits of whatever land she may die
possessed of, during his life, if any such issue shall so long continue;
if she leave no issue, or if57such issue shall afterwards fail, then to the
land itself, during his life.'
In contrast he also proposed that:
If the wife survive the husband, she is entitled to the following proportions of the profits of whatever land he may die possessed of:
viz. if he leave issue, then to one-third part of such profits during her
life, if any such issue shall so long continue: if he leave no issue, or
if such issue shall afterwards fail, then to a moiety of such profits
during her life; to commence respectively from her husband's death,
or from the failure of such issue; as the case may be. 58
In Humphreys' comments following these proposed articles he stated:
"I prefer leaving the land in the hands of the persons most interested
154. Stevenson, Influence of Bentham & Humphreys on the New York Property
Legislation of 1828, 1 Amc. J. LEGAL HST.155 (1957).
155. OBSERVATIONS WITH OUTLINE FOR SYSTEMATIC REFORi 257.
156. Id. at 259.
157. Id. at 257.
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in its good management; and this maxim has guided me in framing
these two articles."' 59 Humphreys also contended that the article
"gives uniformity to every description of disposition by married women,
and places a guard, which is now wanting, against their feebleness,
where their power of appointment is exercisable by deed."'16 0
Humphreys also proposed to abolish the passive or technical
trust, 161 the device used to insure married women a separate estate
prior to the Married Women's Property Acts. A proposed article of
Humphreys provided:
No use, trust, or confidence, shall'be declared of any land, or of any
charge upon the same, for the mere and direct benefit of any third
persons; and all assurances declaring
any such use, trust, or confi1 62
dence shall ... be utterly void.
Another provided:
All dispositions of or respecting land, shall be made to the alienee,
and not to any other person to the use of or in trust for him; and all
estates and interests in land shall be deemed legal rights, cognizable
in the courts of law.163

If the above articles were enacted along with the article allowing third
persons to give land to a married woman, the practical effect would
be that married women could own land with more control over it
than under the prior trust system of keeping married women's estates
16 4
separate. Humphreys did not intend to abolish the active trust.
Consequently, if Humphreys' plan were to be enacted into law, a
trust could be set up for the benefit of a married woman as long as
the trustee would be one entrusted with the "actual disposition,
management, or receipt, of lands or the rents and profits thereof, or
any interest in, or charge upon the same... ."16, A grantor could, there-

fore, make the trust into one set up for active purposes, and legal according to Humphreys' plan, if enacted into law.
159.
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THE MOVEMENT FOR CODIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE

Pound pointed out that great things were exepected of legislative lawmaking or codification in the early days of the Republic.' 6 6
William Butler, the historian of the New York Revised Statutes believed that there was great popular interest in the Revision. 167 Butler's opinion substantiates Pound's theory. Pound claimed that there
existed a powerful idea of "legislative omnicompetence" created by a
belief that the legislators were "peculiarly the representatives of the
sovereign people, with all the powers of the sovereign devolved upon
them."U18
Gordon Wood, a specialist in early American history, explained
this phenomenon. 1 9 American preoccupation with the necessity of
written law to replace the unwritten common law was a consequence
of a new presumption about the nature of law as a command of a
sovereign will. If the law is a command, the source of the command
must be legitimate. That is, it must come from the very people who
were to be governed by the command. Wood also explained the
American fear of judicial discretion: "With no printed indigenous
decisions there could be little reliance on local precedents other than
those in memory, and although English authorities were cited constantly they appear to have expanded rather than restricted judicial
discretion."' 170 American's fear of this unfettered discretion caused the
preference for legislative intervention.' 7 ' They were conscious of the
need for equity's mitigating effect on law but "denied the judicial discretion that made equitable interpretations necessary and possible."' 72
The only judicial discretion tolerated by a steadfast legislative supremacist might be a type of equity on a statute, that is, an application
of the statute by analogy to unprovided for cases.
Another reason for the mood of legislative supremacy was the
dissatisfaction with common law after the Revolution. As Pound
stated, "[t]he common law, as something English, was under a cloud
166.
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after our Revolution."' 173 Anglophobes looked to Roman law as expressed in French law as an alternative. 7 4
Two men hostile to judicial discretion and influenced by the
study of French law led the codification movement in New York.
They were Edward Livingston and David Dudley Field. Their efforts
helped to pave the way for the easy passage of the Married Women's
Property Acts. Consequently, their judicial philosophy is worthy of
close examination.
A. The Contributionsof Edward Livingston
Edward Livingston was born in 1764 into a family prominent in
New York political and legal life since 1675.175 He was a student of
Roman, Spanish and French law as well as Anglo-American common
law.'7 6 In politics, he was a Jeffersonian Republican and a Jacksonian
Democrat. As such he became active in New York State, Louisiana
and national politics. 7 7 One of his favorite political themes was a call
for codification. Unsuccessful in achieving codification in New York,
he was successful in Louisiana, a state whose legal system still is indebted to his work. His philosophy of codification is not only worthy
of examination because of his direct efforts in New York, but also because of his influence on future codifiers and law reformers, active in
that state and the rest of the nation. His ideas form a bridge from
Bentham to David Dudley Field, the man who dedicated his life to
doing for the rest of New York law what the Revised Statutes would
78
do for property law.
Livingston did not share Bentham's faith in the ability to write
a "complete" code. Because he saw the inevitablity of a case coming
before a court which had not been provided for by the code draftsmen, Livingston developed a sophisticated methodology for handling
the "unprovided-for case." This methodology paralleled the con173. FORMATVE ERA 40.
174. Id.

175. W. HATCHER, EDWARD LIVINGSTON, JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRAT 2-4 (1940).
176. Id. at 4.
177. He had served as a district attorney, member of Congress, United States
Senator, presidential aide, and Minister to France.
178. Cf. Address by David Dudley Field, Law Academy of Philadelphia, Apr. 15,
1886, in 3 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 245 (T. Coan ed. 1890) [hereinafter cited as FIELD'S PAPERS].

CODIFICATION MOVEMENT

tinental civil law method of law reform. 179 Livingston explained the
role of the judge after the code was enacted. "If the case be a new one,
he must decide without law; he must frame his judgment by analogical
reasoning from the law in similar cases. .

."10 The

judge should "de-

cide according to such principles as they believe the legislature would
have been guided by had the case been foreseen."''
Nevertheless,
Livingston shared Bentham's hostility for judge-made law. Even if the
judge were to be faced by a truly unprovided for case, there would be
no justification for stare decisis. 182 The purpose for excluding all precedent was two-fold. In the first place, litigants would be protected from
all preexisting uncodified law (what Bentham would have characterized as ex post facto dog training); and secondly, later litigants would
be protected from decisions which were the product of hardened
definitions of code articles. Thus, each new case was to be started with
a fresh examination of the same code article, rather than with a judicial interpretation of the article.
Although Livingston saw the need for some judicial discretion,
on the rare occasion of the truly unprovided-for case, he shared
Bentham's view that law reform was a job for the legislature. However, Livingston's method was more realistic than Bentham's insistence on. a "complete" code. According to Bentham's plan, the
judge was to refer to the legislature the law reform prompted by an
unprovided-for case. This reference was to be a suggestion only. A
judge was never to possess lawmaking powers. In contrast, Livingston
understood that the unprovided-for case had to be decided and that
such decision would be made by a judge. Livingston foresaw the fact
that legal method was a process, and the code system required flexibility just as did the common-law method. He stated that "the best code
that can be provided is but a framework . . . for its own progress
18
toward perfection .... , 3
To insure that codification indeed progressed toward perfection,
Livingston called for a constant revision of the code based on the ac-

179. See E. LIVINGSTON, WORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 91-92 (1873) [hereinafter cited as LIVINGSTON'S WORKS]; Franklin, Concerning the Historical Importance
of Edward Livingston, 11 TUL. L. REv. 163, 180-98 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Importance of Livingston]; Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint, 17 TUL. L. REv. 351, 389-91
(1943) [hereinafter cited as LouisianaBlueprint].
180. 1 LIVINGSTON'S WORKS 586.
181. 2 id. at 458.

182. LouisianaBlueprint 391.
183. 1 LIVINGSTON'S WORKS 173.
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tual practice of the courts deciding disputes between private litigants.
Livingston made this method explicit in a report to the Louisiana
Legislature.
The judges are directed to lay at stated times before the General
Assembly, a circumstantial account of every case for the decision of
which they have thought themselves obliged to recur to the use of
the discretion thus given (by Article 21); while regular reports of
the ordinary cases of construction, to be made by a Commission officer, will enable the Legislative Body to explain ambiguities, supply deficiencies and to correct errors that may be discovered in the Laws
by the test of experience in their operation. By these means our Code,
although imperfect at first, will be progressing towards perfection,
and judicial decisions will be means of improving legislation, but will
not be laws themselves.184
Thus, for Livingston, judicial opinions would operate as reports to
the legislature whenever revision was seen to be necessary by that
branch of government whose function it is to apply the law to individual cases. How this procedure would have worked as both a democratic and an efficient method of law reform, one cannot know for
certain. Although Livingston's civil code was passed into law by the
legislature, his plan for revision of the code was not.188
B. The Contributionsof David Dudley Field
David Dudley Field, the great codifier from New York State, was
influenced by Roman Law, 86 Jeremy Bentham,' 87 Edward Livingston, 8s8 and the success of codification in continental Europe. 8 9 Unlike
the other proponents of codification, Field is reputed to have been
little concerned with revolutionalizing the substantive law and only
concerned with arranging it in a better form. 90 Perhaps this can be
explained by the fact that Field came to the codification movement
at a relatively late date. While the other codifiers worked in the im184. E. LIVINGSTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REvISION OF THE LOUISIANA
CODE 10 (1823).
185. Letter from Edward Livingston to Jeremy Bentham, July 1, 1880, in 2
BENTHAM'S WORKS 51-53.
186. See Field, Answer to Mr. James C. Carter, in 3 FIELD'S PAPERS 417.
187. Note Field's reference to Bentham's dog training analogy. Id. at 420.

188. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 709 (1959).
189. See Address by David Dudley Field, Law Academy of Philadelphia, Apr. 15,
1886, in 3 FIELD'S PAPERS 257.
190. H. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 73-74 (1898).
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mediate aftermath of the American Revolution, which was ultimately
to secure the hegemony of the urban commercial classes, the first draft
of Field's civil code did not appear until 1862 and the final draft
not until 1865. By that time the Revised Statutes had already codified
New York's substantive law of property. Another possible explanation
for Field's reputation for moderatism might be found in the Act of
April 6, 1857, which appointed commissioners of the code. It expressed
what Field felt to be the limited duty of codification, that is, "to reduce into a written and systematic code the whole body of the law
of this State, or so much and such parts thereof as shall seem to them
practicable and expedient. ....
2-91
Despite Field's reputation, he did advocate innovation and not
merely codification of existing law. 192 In fact, Field suggested innovations in his model code. 93 Moreover, Field shared Bentham's, Livingston's and Sampson's concern with the problem of judicial discretion. In an article in the American Law Review, Field stated: "There
are certain propositions which have become maxims of government,
one of which is that the legislative and judicial departments should
be kept distinct, or, in other words, that the same person should not
be both lawgiver and judge."' 94 Again in his Introduction to the
Completed Civil Code

95

he argued: "The question . . .is between

written and unwritten law; that is to say, between law written by the
lawgiver, and law not thus written; between law promulgated by that
department of the government which alone has the prerogative of
making and promulgating the laws, and law not so promulgated."' 9 6
In the same work he contended that if flexibility advocated by the opponents of codification means "that a rule ought to be subject to the
discretion of the Judges, the proposition is unsound, for the Judge
should not have dispensing power."' 97 In a letter to the California
Bar dated November 28, 1870, Field contended that "when the Courts
decide, without a code, they have a greater liberty of decision than
191. 1 FELDs PAPERS 317.

192. See, e.g., id. at 312, 326-27, 337.
193. See, e.g., FIELD COMMISSION, THE

CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

§§ 82, 83, 348, 801, 802, 809, 811, 1829, (1865) [hereinafter cited as FIELD'S
POSED CODE].

194. 3 FIEL's PAPERS 239.
195. FIELD'S PROPOSED CODE at xi.

196. Id. at xiv.
197. 1 FIELD'S PAPERS at 331.
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with it ....
[S]uch liberty... [is] not... a good thing. No Judge
should have power to decide a cause without a rule to decide it by,
else the suitor is subjected to his caprice."' 198
Underlying Field's hostility toward judicial discretion was an .acceptance of the positivist view of what law was and a rejection of a
romantic view expressed by the historical school of law. Field refused
to accept the notion that judges do not make, but only declare, the
common law. In an address before the Law Academy of Philadelphia
on April 5, 1886, Field asked: "Who made this common law, if the
judges did not? Your Legislature did not make it."'1 9 To bolster his
arguments, Field quoted Austin, the positivist who believed law to be
a command from a political superior to a political inferior. Austin
said in ridicule of Blackstone: "What hindered him from seeing this
was a childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by
nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from
time to time by the judges." 20 0 Austin was not the only positivist Field
cited in his arguments for the acceptance of codification. In an answer
to James C. Carter, the leading proponent of the point of view of historical jurisprudence and an opponent to Field and his work, Field
quoted Bentham's famous analogy of common law as dog-training
law 201 Like his predecessors, Field hoped to limit judicial discretion
by making the law simple, understandable and systematically or2
ganized, in other words, codified. 02

By the time Field took over the leadership of the American codification movement, a strong counter attack had developed. His two
significant foes were the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York and James C. Carter, who was under the influence of Savigny's
"historical school of jurisprudence" which was based on German
"Volkish Romanticism." 20 3 From Field's answers to this attack, his
theory of law reform through codification is made clear. 204 Field recog198. Id. at 354.
199. 3 id. at 250.
200. Id. at 250-51.

201. Id. at 420.

202. 1 id. at 317-23.
203. For the philosophy and arguments of this counter movement, see J.
LAW-ITS ORIGIN

AND

GROWTH

CARTER,

(1907); Address by James C. Carter, Virginia State

Bar Association Annual Meeting, July 25, 1889.
204. One of the many places in which Field addressed the objections to his proposed civil code is in the introduction to the 1865 version. FIELD'S PROPOSED CODE at xi.
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nized that inherent in the objections to his plan was the belief that
it was not possible to provide for all future cases. 20 5 His answer was
that in penal cases if an individual committed an act not proscribed
by the code, he was to go without punishment, 20 6 since no one should
be punished for an ex post facto law. If it were a civil matter that
was unprovided for, Field, like Livingston, recommended that analogies be made from the general rules of the code.20 7 Field proposed an
explicit formula for judges who, after the code was passed, were
faced with an unprovided-for case.
[I]f there be an existing rule of law omitted from this code, and not
inconsistent with it, that rule will continue to exist in the same form
in which it now exists; while if any new rule, noW for the first time
introduced, should not answer the good ends for which it is intended,
which can be known only from experience, it can be amended or
abrogated by the same lawgiving department which made it; and if
new cases arise, as they will, which have not been foreseen, they may
be decided, if decided at all, precisely as they would now be decided,
that is to say, by analogy to some rule in the Code, or to some rule
and therefore still existing, or by the dictates
omitted from the 20Code
8
of natural justice.

Thus Field, being more realistic than Bentham, foresaw the inevitability of some judicial discretion. Instead of merely decreeing that
it shall not exist, Field concentrated his efforts on tempering this discretion by means of the code methodology. Field, concerned as Bentham with restricting judge-made law, saw a distinction that Bentham
did not between ex post facto judicial policy-making and the administration of the laws by judicial application of established policies to
the circumstances of each case as it arose. Field considered the former
to be strictly forbidden; 20 the latter would be legitimate.21 0 As an
example, Field explained that establishing general rules or policies,
such as that a contract is void if against public policy, is a job for the
legislature, while deciding what is or is not against the policy, is a job
for the courts.2 1 1 The purpose of allowing this distinction was to pro205. Id. at xvi.

206. Id. at xvii.
207. Id. at xviii.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at xix.
at xxH-xxii.
at xxiv.
at xxiv-xxv.
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vide enough flexibility to keep law as a process simultaneously stable
and, therefore, not ex post facto and yet progressive enough to meet
12
social and economic changes from generation to generation.
In order to insure that progress in the law would come from the
legislature-that is from the general principles embodied in the code
and not from the judiciary in the form of stare decisis or judicial discretion contrary to the principles embodied in the code-Field wrote
what would have been sections six and 2032 had his civil code been
adopted. Section six stated that: "In this State there is no common law,
in any case, where the law is declared by the five Codes," 218 and section 2032 mandated that: "[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed, has no application to
' 214
this Code.
It is clear from Field's own reference that he was influenced by
Roman Law 215 and by continental jurisprudence 210 as was Livingston.
Both men hoped that a code and the method of analogical interpretation would, if enacted, provide the same legislative control over lawmaking as they believed existed in Europe. However, the commonlaw method was too deeply entrench in New York by the second
half of the 19th century for this hope to be realized. 217 Consequently,
unlike Livingston's proposals in Louisiana, Field's proposed civil code
was never made New York State law.
Another factor underlying Field's years of struggle for law reform was his generally progressive spirit. He, like Livingston, exhibited
an enduring faith in science and the perfectibility of society. In fact
some of his arguments for codification were couched in analogies from
scientific or technological progress. 218 Because he was part of that
tradition which believed in progress, science, and the perfectibility of
society, Field could work for scientific law reforms, international peace,
feminism, and abolition of slavery. Thus, Field could share Humph212. Id.
213. Id. § 6.
214. Id. § 2032.
215. 3 FIELD'S PAPERS 412-19; 1 id. at 310.
216. See, e.g., FIELD'S PROPOSED CODE, XV, XVi, XXX; 1 FIELD'S PAPERs 310, 326,
346, 358; 3 id. at 257.
217. Importance of Livingston 169.
218. See, e.g., 1 FIELD'S PAPERS 340 (analogy to the development of the railway);
3 id. at 251 (analogy to the laying of the first transatlantic cable by his brother Cyris
W. Field).
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reys' desire to make land as easily and securely alienable as any other
item of commerce. 219 But he, unlike Humphreys, was motivated by a
pro-feminist position as well. In his civil code some of the substantive
innovations he suggseted concerned the rights of married women. He
wrote provisions, which if they had been enacted, would have "secured" the equal rights of married women in respect to their children
and their property. For example, he would have included sections
220
"abolishing at the same time both dower and curtesy."
Field was able to see the interrelationship between feudalism
and married women's lack of civil capacity. He blamed the common
law for its retention of "feudal tenures with all their burdensome
incidents .. . land.., inalienable without livery of seisin, and wives
...
[having] only the rights which a barbarous age conceded them."2 1
He felt that only through codification could "the closer assimilation of
the law of real and personal property, and the changes in the relation
of husband and wife, as to property . . . be effected ... wisely and
safely"22 2 since "[t]he careful student of history will find that from the
time when the English judges resisted the negotiability of the notes of
merchants down to the hour when the last shackle was stricken from
the hands of woman in the holding of her own property and taking
the fruit of her own labor, the real and healthy growth of the law
has proceeded not from the seats of judges, but from the halls of legis'223
lative assemblies.
It is clear that Field can be credited with presenting the interrelationship of feudalism and married women's status. If his civil code
had been passed, the gaps in reform left by Humphreys and the Revisers would have been filled. Nevertheless, Field's Code of Civil Procedure was passed in 1848 and by the same legislature which passed the
Married Women's Property Acts. This code of procedure was the
same for the jurisdictions of law and equity, since the New York Constitution of 1846 had abolished Chancery. With Chancery abolished,
the Married Women's Act of 1848 was needed merely to maintain the
status quo, since Chancery had been for centuries the protector of
married women's separate property.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See 3 id. at 265; 1 id. at 320-21.
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V. THE

EFFECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE

REFORM MOVEMENT ON THE
PRIOR LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN-THE INCOMPLETE REFORM

The passage of the New York Married Women's Property Act of
1848 was a result of many factors. The question is-why was it passed
in New York State in 1848? A simple answer is that it was passed because women agitated for it. But such answer begs the question, leaving
the more fundamental questions unanswered. Why did women agitate
for such act in 1848 in New York State? Why did an all male legislature respond affirmatively? The answers to these questions cannot be
understood apart from the history of the statutory changes in property
law which occurred in New York in the 182 0 's and 1830's. These
changes simultaneously weakened equity, the historic safeguarder of
the property of wealthy women and defeudalized the law of real property thereby' greatly expanding the number of potential property
owners of both sexes.
A. Uses and Trusts Under the Revised Statutes of 1836
One important factor was that the trust was in a tenuous state
by 1836. The New York State Revised Statutes of that year severely
limited its application. Consequently, the debate between 1836 and
1848 was whether to fill the void left by the Revised Statutes' limitations on the trust by a new statute which could accomplish the same
goal in a more direct way, or to restore the trust to its old position of
viability. The proponents of a thorough law reform through legislation advocated the former while the opponents of the Married Women's
Property Acts opted for the latter alternative. Before examining the
nature of the debate it is important to understand what the Revised
Statutes had done to the trust.
The second half of the Revised Statutes of 1836 concerned the
acquisition, enjoyment and transmission of real and personal property. Chapter one, title two, article two, concerned the law of uses and
trusts. Section 45, the first section of article two, provided that:
Uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified, in the Article,
are abolished; and every estate and interest in lands, shall be deemed
a legal right, cognizable as such in the courts of law, except when
otherwise provided in this Chapter. 224
224. 1 N.Y. Rxv. STAT., pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2, § 45 (1836).
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Complementing this abolition of uses and trusts was section 46 which
provided that: "Every estate which is now held as an use, executed
under any former statute of this state, is confirmed as a legal estate, 212 5
and by section 47 which provided that:
Every person, who, by virtue of any grant, assignment or devise,
now is, or hereafter shall be entitled to the actual possession of lands,
and the receipt of the rents and profits thereof, in law or in equity,
shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality
and duration, and subject to the same conditions as his beneficial
interest.226
The effect of these provisions was to make equitable estates legal.
That is, the prior equitable owner or beneficiary of the trust was to
become the legal owner and the prior legal owner or trustee was to
have no interest. However, since the legal estate of a married woman
in 1836 belonged to her husband, if her equitable estate were to be
executed into a legal estate, she would lose her equitable or beneficial
ownership without gaining a corresponding legal estate. Thus, the
reform of 1836 with respect to a married woman was an incomplete
reform and would remain such until she gained a corresponding right
to own property at law.
The "except when otherwise provided" clause of section 45 referred to sections 48, 50 and 55. Section 48, recognizing the validity of
active trusts, provided that:
The last preceding section shall not divest the estate of any trustees,
in any existing trust, where the title of such trustees, is not merely
nominal, but is connected with some power of actual disposition or
management,
in relation to the lands which are the subject of the
2 27
trust.

Section 50 provided:
The proceeding sections in this article shall not extend to trusts, arising or resulting by implication of law, nor be construed to prevent
or affect the creation
of such express trusts, as are hereinafter author228
ized and defined..
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at § 46.
Id. at § 47.
Id. at § 48.
Id. at § 50.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Section 55 provided that:
Express trusts may be created, for any or either of the following purposes:
1. To sell lands for the benefit of the creditors;
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefits of legatees,
or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon;
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them to
the use of any person, during the life of such person, or for any
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of
this Title;
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to accumulate
the same, for the purposes and within the limits prescribed in the
first Article of this Title.2- 9
The statutes were revised again in 1846 but the article on uses and
trusts was substantially the same as the 1836 law.2 30 This is also true
231
of the proposed Field Code provisions which were not made into law.
In the notes which followed the 1836 edition,2 32 the Revisers justified their radical treatment of the trust by declaring that:
In England, the necessity of such reform was confessed during the
last session of its parliament, by the leading statesmen of every party;
and in consequence of the success of Mr. Broughan's motion,
founded on his celebrated speech, commissioners have been appointed, to whom, with other subjects, the trusts-of inquiring into
the state of the laws of real property, and reporting suitable changes
2
and improvements, has been specially committed. 3
They also expressed an admiration for the demystified continental
civil law which had influenced their work.
If we direct our attention to the laws of other nations and countries,
we shall find, perhaps to our surprise, that so far as they relate to
real property, they are in a measure free from the objections to
which our system is liable. In the civil law, the regulations concerning the enjoyment, alienation and transmission of real estate, com229.
230.
(1836).
231.
232.
233.

(1836).

Id. at § 55.
Compare 2 id., at ch. 2, tit. 2, art. 2 (1846) with 1 id. at ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 2
See FIELD'S PROPOSED CODE, at §§ 274-99.
Some of these notes were written in connection with the 1828 Revision.
Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. 580
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paratively speaking, are neither numerous, nor difficult to be understood, and in the Code Napoleon, they form a very small and perfectly intelligible portion of that immortal work. It is not extravagant to say that the French law of real estate, may be sufficiently un34
derstood by a few days of diligent study.
The Revisers explained the reasons for abolishing the trusts,
despite the fact that trusts had so long been utilized to mitigate
fe'udalism.
[U]ses were attended with many inconveniences, and led to great
abuses. They tended to defraud creditors who had no remedy against
the equitable estate and purchasers, whose conveyances or leases from
the equitable owner, the trustee, could always avoid. They enable the
trustee, by conveying, or submitting to a disseisin, and by other means,
to defeat the rights of the beneficial owner; and a frequent resort to
equity became necessary, to compel him to perform the trust. And, in
our judgment, above all, by separating the legal and equitable estate,
and introducing two classes of rights over the same lands, governed
by different rules, and subject to different jurisdictions they rendered
titles perplexed and obscure, and multiplied litigation. 35
Thus, influenced by Lord Broughan's speech, the Revisers aimed to
substantially restore the Statute of Uses while adding statutory substitutes so to maintain the beneficial aspects of the use or trust. As they
stated in their notes:
It is to remove these serious inconveniences . . . that the Revisers

propose the entire abolition of uses, whilst by the new provisions which
they have suggested, all the benefits admitted to flow from the present system, are retained and increased. By making a grant without
the actual delivery of possession or livery of seisin, effectual to pass
every estate and interest in lands, . . . the utility of conveyances de-

riving their effect from the statute of uses, is superseded, and a cheap
intelligible and universal form of transferring titles is substituted in
their place. The new modifications of property which uses have sanctioned, are preserved by repealing the rules of the common law, by
which they were prohibited and permitting every estate to be created
by grant, which can be created by devise. And this is the effect of
the provisions in relation to expectant estates, contained in the first
Article of this Title.2 6
234. Id.
235. Id. at 582.
236. Id. at 583.
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The Revisers' decision to abolish only formal trusts and to allow
the active trust was influenced by Humphrey. 2 37 Formal trusts were
abolished, according to the Revisers' notes because:
[I]t is plainly needless to retain them. They separate the legal and
equitable estate, for no purpose that the law ought to sanction.
They answer no end whatever but to facilitate fraud; to render titles
more complicated, and to increase the business of chancery.2 38
But, as to active trusts the Revisers' stated:
[A]ctive trusts, as a late writer, (Mr. Humphreys), has properly
termed them, are recognized in every system of law, and their utility,
under proper restrictions, is undeniable. They seem, indeed, indispensable to the proper enjoyment and management of property.
The Revisers, therefore, propose to retain them, only limiting their
continuance, . . . and defining the purposes for which they may be
created.2 9
As these references indicate, the formal trust was abolished for
sound commercial reasons such as decreasing fraud and increasing the
marketability of land. Also an important consideration was the desire
to limit the business of Chancery by simplifying the law of property
so to negate the prior need to resort to Chancery. Taking a comparative law approach, the Revisers decided to retain the active trust which
could be utilized for those who were indeed incapable of managing
their own property. The active trust they distinguished from the
formal trust which they claimed existed "for no purpose that the law
ought to sanction." Perhaps they overlooked the purpose of keeping
a married woman's property separate from her husband's.
B. Reaction to the Treatment of the Trust by the Revised Statutes
The abolition of the formal trust by the Revisers was not without opposition. Chancellor Kent felt that the trust provisions could
not work. In his famous and widely read Commentaries on American
Law, he contended that the desire to "preserve and perpetuate family
influence and property" was "very prevalent with mankind" and was
237. See id. (references to Humphreys made by the Revisers).
238. Id.
239. Id. Implied trusts also were not abolished. They were retained to prevent
fraud. Provisions on dower were similar to Humphrey's outline. See I N.Y. Rav. STAT.,
pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 3 (1836).
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"deeply seated in the affections." 240 "We cannot hope," he argued, to
"check the enterprising spirit of gain, the pride of families, the anxieties of parents, the importunities of luxury, the fixedness of habits, the
subtleties of intellect." 2 41 Skeptical of law reform through legislation,
he predicted widespread evasion: the "fairest and proudest models of
legislation that can be matured in the closet" could not prevail against
242
the "usages of a civilized people."
In the law journals of the day, the debate was carried on. The
American Jurist ran a series entitled "Codification and Reform of the
Law."243 The July 1839 issue dealt with the question of the abolition
of the use. The author condemned it as a dangerous example of
"hasty legislation '2 44 and "ill-considered reform." 24 The article accused the Revisers of being
dismayed by the intricate learning of uses and trusts, and feeling
themselves unprepared to meet the arduous task of encountering its
"refinements, distinctions and abstruseness," they vainly resolved to
make an effort to sweep away the mass altogether, to make the system intelligible and consistent. 246
The pros and cons of the Revisers' attack on the trust as well as on
feudal tenures, was carried on in many more journals between 1886
and 1848.24 7 This wide-spread publicity is evidence that the legal community was well aware of the controversy and so were the members
of the legislature.
240. 4 J.
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244. Id. at 353.
245. Id. at 357.
246. Id. at 369.
247. See, e.g., Recent Revisions & c. of Statute Laws: New York, 18 Am. JURIST
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Trusts as Affected by the Revised Statutes of the State of New York, 6 Am. L. MAGAzrNE 268 (1845).
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By the time the married women's property bills were before the
legislature, the arguments had crystalized. The reports from the committee on the judiciary on the petitions to extend and protect the
rights of property of married women demonstrate the fact that the
fate of those petitions were intermingled with the movement for law
reform previously discussed. A report in favor of the acts came out of
committee on April 12, 1842. Although the committee felt too constrained by other priorities to frame the act at that time, they were
in unanimous agreement in favor of a more liberal extension of the
rights of married women. Their bias against the feudal common law
and in favor of the legislative reform movement is demonstrated in
their statement regarding the feasibility of passing such an act. Referring to the committee's concern for the delicacy of the institution of
marriage which would be affected by such legislation, the report
stated:
Consistently with this principle of prudence they yet think that something of a safe and salutory character could be done and ought to
be done, to engraft at least partially upon the hard and stubborn
trunk of the common law the more liberal principle in relation to
this subject of which a successful precedent has long been held out
to as 8in most of the codes of other countries founded on the civil
24
law.
Two years later another report came out of this same committee.
In contrast to the former one, the report of February 26, 1844 is illus-

trative of the arguments against the act. But similar to the former report, this report also places the debate over the Married Women's
Property Act into the context of the broader debate over law reform.
In fact, the issue was placed into this context by petitioners asking
the legislature to revise the law of married women's property. The
petitioners, hostile to the trust, asked that an act be introduced which
would secure the property and protect the rights of married women
without reference to any express trust created for the benefit of the
wife. 249 The petitioners were hostile to the common law as well. In
their petitions, they decried the husband's entitlement to his wife's
property.250
248. N.Y. AssE -. Doc. No. 189, 64 Sess., at 2 (April 12, 1842).
249. N.Y. AssEmx. Doc. No. 96, 67 Sess., at 1 (Feb. 26, 1844) [hereinafter cited as

Doc. No. 96].
250. Id. at 2.
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The remedy sought by the petitioners was that the property, both
real and personal, belonging to any women before marriage or that
may thereafter be transferred, conveyed or vested in any married
woman by deed, gift, bequest or devise shall be held and deemed to
be her own separate estate and subject to her own conduct and disposal in the same manner and as effectually as if she were a single
woman.2 51 Reasons were provided by the petitioners to support their
request.
The law which deprives the wife of her own property, making her
wholly dependent on her husband for support, is liable to destroy the
very elements of domestic harmony and happiness, to diminish the
self-respect of woman, and thereby the respect of her fellow beings,
prevents the improvement of married women, and begets a spirit of
meanness and duplicity which 2is52unfavorable alike to the happiness
and best interests of both parties.
It is interesting to see how the committee answered these complaints. First they presented the argument of historicism. The committee report argued that the law had "formed a part of the common law
for centuries"2 53 and has "stood the test of time." 2514 Then they argued

in favor of judicial law making and against legislative innovations.
One of the greatest evils of the day is excessive legislation and continued change of our statutory regulations. So long as legislation is
confined to a correction of ascertained and known defects or evils,
so far it is legitimate and useful, but beyond that, it is dangerous and
may be mischievous. "Stare decisis" is a maxim, the importance of
which is known to and appreciated by everyone at all familiar with
judicial decisions, and to "abide by the law as written," should be a
maxim of equal force with legislators, until a manifest evil is shown to
exist, and a clear and plain remedy for that evil is pointed out.255
Here is a reversal of the codifiers argument. The uncertainties of the
law are not caused by stare decisis as the codifiers would argue, but
according to this committee report arise "from the frequent attempts
to remedy by legislation. ' 2 56 To support this assertion the committee
251. Id. at 3.
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253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

made a comparison between the state of society in countries where
the feudal common law existed and the state of society where the
codified post-revolutionary civil law governed the rights of married
women. The hostility toward France and the French Civil Code shows
clearly through this "comparison." The committee's reporter concluded that:
[I]n the European states, and particularly France, the effect of these
laws upon the morals of the community is very apparent, and if the
spirit of innovation, which is now so rife in the land, is allowed to
prevail, and that code of laws which is now in operation is but a
small part our territory, shall prevail throughout the states it will be
found that like causes produce like effects, and we shall rival France
and some of the other continental nations in the laxity of our
2 57
morals

The fear of the codification movement, which admittedly was modeled
on the French Civil Code, is apparent in that argument. Also apparent
is a fear that the proposed legislation would damage the institution of
marriage. Speaking against France, the reporter contended:
Husband and wife having their separate property, . . . have also

their separate amours and intrigues; each interfering as little with
the other in this matter, as they do in their pecuniary matters. A
lover separate from the husband becomes almost a necessary appendage to the wife; and this laxity of morals, beginning as it does
from this cause, is not confined to the circle within which it has its
origin, but it extends by its example through all classes.
The want of chastity in the female is not considered a deadly
offence, . . . and why is this? It is because infidelity to the marriage
vow is tolerated at least, if not encouraged by the laws, destroying
in part the unity of the married state.25 8

Although the reporter was hostile to law reform through legislation, he was receptive to law reform by equity. He stated that the
committee believed "experience has shown that no evil can result
from giving to the wife the benefit of property intended for her use
through the intervention of a trust."25 9 The report argued that the
trust did not interfere with morality and chastity as would a married
women's property act.
257. Id. at 8.
258. Id. at 9.
259. Id. at 10.

CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
It is believed that the management of property for the benefit of
the wife, through the intervention of a trustee, will be less likely
to produce collision between husband and wife than the direct management of it by the wife, aside from the fact that the direction and
control of the property being regulated by the terms of the trust, it
is impossible that the interests of the husband20 and wife can run
counter to each other in respect to their property. 6
The committee which reviewed the petition requesting "an act for
the more effectual protection of the rights of property of married
women" concluded that it was the Revised Statutes which created the
necessity for the legislature to more effectively protect married
women's property. Noting the gaps in the law created by the Revised
Statutes, the reporter pointed out that no longer could real property
be secured to the separate use of the wife by an antenuptial settlement or by settlement made after marriage by a third person making
the husband a trustee. 261 The committee believed that: "[I]n the attempt to codify and simplify the law of uses and trusts, this class of
trust estates was inadvertently omitted by the Revisers and by the
22
Legislature."
Thus, the critics of the French Civil Code were also those who
opposed the Revisers' treatment of uses and trusts and the petition for
a Married Women's Property Act. The Committee advised the House
that the act for the more effectual protection of the rights of property
of married women ought not to be passed into law.2 63 Instead they of2 64
fered a substitute bill entitled an Act in Relation to Uses and Trusts.

They hoped that:
With an alteration of the law, by permitting trusts in real estate to be
created for the sole benefit of feme covert, females and their friends
have it in their power, whenever prudence may dictate it, to secure
the property of the wife in the safest possible manner, without at all
endangering the happiness of her for whose benefit it was designed.2 65
Nevertheless, their recommendations were not destined to prevail.
Two years later the Constitution of 1846 abolished Chancery, the
260. Id.
261. Id.

262. Id.
263. Id. at 11.
264. Id.

265. Id. at 10.
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court which created trusts as a method of law reform, and four years
after this report the first New York Married Women's Property Act
was passed to fill the void in the law of married women's property
caused by the limitations placed on uses and trusts by the Revised
Statutes and the abolition of Chancery. 26

VI. A PROPOSED MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY AcT:
A REACTION TO THE LAW REFORM
MOVEMENT'S INCOMPLETE REFORM

Judge Thomas Herttell introduced a bill for the protection and
preservation of the rights and property of married women in April,
1837,267 over a decade before the first Married Women's Property Act

was passed. Since Herttell's proposed bill and the arguments he advanced in support of it were motivated by both feminism and a commitment to fill the gaps left by the Revised Statutes with regard to the
property of married women, his efforts are worthy of close examination despite the fact that his bill was never enacted into law. His
work is also important because his arguments were reprinted into
a widely read pamphlet which inspired female activists to petition the
legislature for an act to more effectively protect married women's
property.
The first section of the Herttell bill provided that a married
woman could hold legal title, as if single, of any property, both real
and personal. Like the Married Women's Property Act of 1848, which
was actually passed, a married woman under the proposed Herttell
bill would have been entitled to hold legal title to any property acquired by "inheritance, gift, bequest or devise." 208 Unlike the 1848
Act, however, the Herttell bill would have given legal title to a
married woman of that property "which she may acquire by her own
industry and management." 26 9 This included "rents, issues, or profits
of real estate." 27 0 Thus a married woman would have been entitled to
266.
267.
268.
272 (3d

N.Y. SEN. J., March 29, 1848, at 443; N.Y. AssEM. J., April 6, 1848, at 1129.
N.Y. AssEm. J., Apr. 24, 1837, at 121.
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the wages she earned as well as to the money made on money acquired
by gift or inheritance.
271
Wages and earnings were not protected by the 1848 Act.
Therefore, the Herttell bill would have granted more rights to
women themselves, than the bill which was actually enacted into law
in 1848. This is an indication of a pro-feminist inclination on the part
of Herttell which was absent in the drafter of the later act. The 1848
Act in reality protected the property of the married woman's father
rather than that which a married woman acquired herself. The Herttell bill also would have obliterated the distinction between dower
and curtesy, medieval concepts which had provided a widow with a
life estate of only one-third of the lands of her deceased husband and
a widower with a life estate in all of his deceased wife's lands so
long as a child was born alive. Section two of Herttell's proposed bill
provided:
That on the demise of the wife during the lifetime of her husband,
he shall be entitled to such portion of the property owned and possessed by his wife at the time of her demise, in like manner and to the
same or like extent, as by the laws of this state the widow is entitled
to have and possess
of the property possessed by her husband at the
27 2
time of his demise.
This provision tends to indicate that Herttell was more a feminist than
advocates of married women's property of the following decade.
A close examination of provisions of his proposed bill further
illustrates Herttell's feminist motivations. Section three of Herttell's
bill demonstrated his belief that the husband was the enemy against
whom the wife needed the protection of the legal system. It provided
that it would be "unlawful" 27 3 for a married woman to convey her
real or personal property to her husband unless by order of a chancellor
or vice chancellor. Such a judicial officer, moreover, must be "satisfied on due proof" 27 4 that the wife was acting voluntarily and that the
purposes for the transfer "appear to be proper, just and necessary,
275
and beneficial to the wife."
271. [1848] N.Y. LAws ch. 200.
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Section five implicitly recognized that women were competent
adults-providing that a married woman could lawfully dispose of her
estate by will "in a like manner . . . as other persons are by law
authorized to do." 2 78 Section four of the bill was redundant in light
of section one (except for the provision of a right to convey). It restated the concept that a married woman should hold legal title to all
property, deed, gift, bequest, devise or earnings. However, this section
would have introduced into the bill the concept of married women's
"separate estate," a term of art derived from equity law. The property,
Herttell proposed, should be "deemed to be her own separate estate
. .. subject to her own control and disposal, in like manner and as
effectively as if she were feme sole, [a single woman]."

277

Despite Herttell's introduction of this phrase from equity, it is
clear that he intended more than a codification of the status quo, that
is to say, more than a codification of equity. His remarks in the New
York State Assembly on May 20, 1836 in support of his resolution concerning the rights and property of married women demonstrated a
feminist motivation. Again Herttell vilified the husband hoping for a
new law to "protect the rights and property of married women from
injury and waste by means of the improvident, prodigal, intemperate
278
and dissolute habits and practices of their husbands.)

Herttell was motivated by a type of feminism founded on an analogy to black slavery. He decried the law giving married women's property to the husband as "unjust in principle, oppressive in its operation,
and demoralizing in its results.."279 Characterizing married women as

"like African captives. .. sold... to a master, ' 28 0 he added that "[b]y
depriving the wife of her property, and vesting it in her husband...
she becomes in a manner, a pauper, dependent ever for subsistence
solely on her husband." 2 8 ' Herttell asked "what human being is more

unjustly treated-more injured, abused, and unhappy or more to be
commiserated than a wife and a mother, when subjected to the evils
above mentioned. . . .,,?22 Herttell was also concerned about the evils
incident to a woman's marriage to a fortune hunter. Changes in the law,
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
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282.
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he predicted, would have many beneficial results, A wife, for example,
would be "respected as the equal of a good husband 283 and gross societal evils such as pauperism, ignorance and crime would be cured.2 84
In addition to Herttell's emphasis on what might be termed
feminism or equal rights for women, he was also clearly motivated by
Anglophobia. It was directed against the Anglophile conservative
American judiciary which was keeping the law feudal despite the
American Revolution and a newly instituted government. Hatred
of feudal vestiges is evident in Herttell's characterization of the law
giving a married woman's property to her husband as "a law which
originated in the dark ages, in a foreign country, in which an absolute
and despotic king, and an intolerant and persecuting clergy, ruled a
people oppressed, demoralized and degraded, by an unhallowed combination of political and ecclesiastical tyranny .... -"285 Herttell believed
it a job for the legislature to demolish the judiciary 2 8 for permitting
laws sanctioning the "anomalous and inconsistent spectacle of having
established a constitution and government based on the sovereign power
of the people and the principle of equal rights, and then adopting laws
which originated many ages since under a monarchial government,
and were intended and calculated to sustain it . .. ,287 This "anomalous and inconsistent spectacle," Herttell suggested, was the source
of "all, or most of the evils which elicit the loud, frequent and well
grounded complaints which are now so generally heard against our
whole judiciary system ... ,"288
Herttell, like the codifiers, was interested in legal defeudalization. To this end he argued that:
The whole fabric of our present judiciary must be demolished, and
all the rotten rubbish of ob~oleie, antiquated and complex principles,
forms and proceedings of feudal times, which have been incautiously
retained in, or incorporated with, our judiciary system, and by which
inadequate to its intended purpose, must be swept
it has become
28 9
away....
283. Id, at 270.
284. Id. at 271.
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After the old judicial power based on English feudal law was abolished, Herttell hoped that a new system "more simple, prompt and
less expensive-more propitious to the furtherance of justice-more
consistent with the object of our free government-more congenial
with the spirit and provisions of our constitution, and more in harmony with the equal rights and liberties of the people, can be fully
290
reared and accomplished."
Judge Thomas Herttell's arguments in the Assembly in support
of his 1837 bill were published as a pamphlet in 1839.21 Apparently it
was widely read throughout the state since it went through several
editions. It helped prepare the public and the legislators for the passage
of the Married Women's Property Act of 1848. It also inspired women
reformers such as Ernestine Rose and Elizabeth Cady Stanton to petition the legislature for such action. His arguments, therefore, are
worthy of examination. Like those in his speech the year before, the
arguments in this pamphlet demonstrate a feminist sympathy. He again
presented the case for married women through arguments analogizing
their position to that of an African slave.29

2

Like most 19th-century

feminists, Herttell was influenced by the Enlightenment and its natural rights philosophy. He argued that there was a natural right to
own property and that married women were human beings who should
not be denied the same rights enjoyed by males and unmarried females.2 93 New York State's denial of this right to married women, in
his judgment, was therefore contrary to both natural law and the
29 4
New York State Constitution.
What is most interesting about Herttell's speech, however, is
neither his feminism nor his Enlightenment outlook. Rather, it is the
affinity of his thought to ideas of those who were interested in law
reform. As such, the speech clearly indicates why the Married Women's
Property Acts were passed with so little resistance. Like the law reformers, Herttell was hostile to the reception of the British common
law because it was feudal and inappropriate for a commercial econ290. Id.
291. T. HERTTELL, THE RIGHT OF MARRIED WOMEN TO HOLD AND CONTRACT
PROPERTY SUSTAINED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1839).
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omy.29 5 In fact, the Herttell bill was partly drafted by John C. Spencer,
one of the Revisers of the Statutes. 96 Herttell's arguments demonstrate
that the Married Women's Property Acts were necessitated by the incomplete revolution which occurred in revising the statutes. Herttell
contended that the parts of the Revised Statutes, which continued the
English common-law rule of taking the property of a married woman
97
and vesting it in her husband were unconstitutional.
The Revised Statutes, although a great step toward defeudalization and modernization of the law of property, did not go far enough
toward making the law of married women conform to the needs of
a commercial society. Herttell pinpointed the reason.
The Revisers started with the intention of prescribing and defining the
trusts and powers relative to personal as well as real estate. Yet there
is not to be found in our Statute book a solitary provision
by virtue
298
of which a trust can be legally createdfor personalpropery.

This meant, according to Herttell, that money, bonds, notes and other
personal property all had to go to the husband. Only parents with
landed wealth, not parents with commercial wealth, could give or bequeath property to a daughter in trust.
This was not the only shortcoming of the Reviser's treatment of
the trust. Harttell pointed out that
the right of a female after marriage, to execute a trust and power
created before marriage, is so very questionable, that it is seldom

hazarded and never attempted by any well informed and discreet
parent, to secure property by such means, to a daughter and her children, with a view to protect it from loss or waste through
the mis2 99
fortune of a good, or the misconduct of a bad husband.
Moreover, even though the trust of real property for the use of a
married woman was secure, the result remained unsatisfactory to
Herttell's critical analysis. The married woman beneficiary "can have
neither pins, needles, hose, linen, nor any other article but such as
the trustee shall be requisite and necessary, and which he must buy
295. See id.
at 7, 8, 15, 57.
296. Id. at 5.
297. Id. at 8, 14.
298. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
299. Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

and furnish for the wife of another man! 8' 0 Herttell assumed that
"no father could wish a daughter to be placed in such an unpleasant
predicament; nor would any husband, good or bad, nor any wife, be
satisfied with such an arrangement."3'0 Hertttell rejected any concept
of the husband and wife as two with one interest, "and what interests,"
he asked, "are more separate and distinct than when one of the married parties takes all, (both power and property,) and leaves the other
8 02
nothing, but the legal obligation to submit without a murmur?
This unwholesome state of affairs, he argued, worked against the
domestic harmony sought by those opposed to granting married women
the right to own property.30 3 Thus Herttell astutely recognized that
in order to gain support for an act which was to render changes in
family law, it was helpful to argue that the changes would reinforce
rather than weaken traditional notions of good intrafamily relationships.
The women who petitioned the legislature in the years between
the Herttell bill and the 1848 Act utilized similar arguments. In their
petition the women stated: "The law which deprives the wife of her
own property, making her wholly dependent on her husband for support, is liable to destroy the very elements of domestic harmony and
happiness .... ,"304 Moreover, their arguments in favor of the passage
of a married woman's property act demonstrate both affinity for Herttell's feminism and for the law-reform movement's concern with the
political need for defeudalization and modernization of the private
law of property. In the final analysis, it was the alliance with defeudalization rather than the feminist arguments which insured passage of
this bill with so little resistance. Nevertheless, it was a feminist victory and it was this silent victory which helped to launch the later
noisy campaign for women's suffrage.
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 67.
303. Id. at 67, 71.
304. Doc. No. 96 at 3. Whether a husband and wife usually had divergent interests may or may not be true. The cases which litigated disputes involving the question
of married women's property are evidence for the actual impact the statute was to have.
These cases demonstrate that the situation was more complex than merely a struggle
between a good woman and a "prodigal" husband. In fact, most of the cases construing
the Acts, arose from disputes in which the husband and wife had similar interests in a
struggle against third party creditors of one or both spouses.

CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
VII. THE

NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

THE FIRST NEW YORK MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY

1846

AND

ACT

A. The Convention of 1846
Some of the most prominent members of the 19th century women's
rights movement contended that the spirit of the 1846 New York State
Constitutional Convention and the newly enacted constitution facili-

tated passage of the Married Women's Property Acts two years later.30 5
Similarly, David Dudley Field attributed to the Convention a mandate to him and the other code commissioners, to undertake the "work
of codification which was contemplated by the Constitution of

1846 .... "806 Indeed, the Constitution of 1846 carried three provisions
aimed at law reform by legislation. The 12th section of article one

provided that: "All Feudal tenures of every description, with all their
incidents are declared to be abolished .... 307 The 17th section of the
first article provided that:
The Legislature, at its first session after the adoption of this constitution shall appoint three Commissioners whose duty it shall be to
reduce into a written and systematic Code the whole body of the
law of this State, or so much and such parts thereof as to the said
3 08
Commissioners shall seem practicable ....
The 24th section of the sixth article further provided that:
The Legislature, at its first session after the adoption of this constitution, shall provide for the appointment of three Commissioners
whose duty it shall be to revise, reform, simplify and abridge the
rules and practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of the courts of
record of this State....309
Since both the Married Women's Property Act and the movement
for codification, two efforts to modernize and defeudalize the laws,
gained impetus from this constitutional convention, it is worth closer
305. 1 E. STANTON, S. ANTHONY & M. GAGE, THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFPFAGE 63 (1889) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE] (see the editorial
comments). Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Gage were renowned 19th-century feminist activists.
306. 1 FRELD's PAPERS 322.
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examination. To begin, the Constitution of 1846 abolished the court
of Chancery by failing to provide for it in article VI as well as by
merging law and equity in article VI section three. Prior to the convention, Chancery both protected married women's property through
the device of the trust and functioned as a major force in defeudalization of substantive property law and in the development of the
law merchant whose interests were inadequately provided for at common law. Thus, the effects of the convention were two-fold. It reflected
a democratic spirit which called for an expanded franchise, and it
created yet another gap in law reform by equity which was subsequently filled by the codification of equity principles into the Married
Women's Property Acts.
The 1846 Constitutional Convention thoroughly debated the subject of married women's property rights. The convention opened
Monday, June 1, 1846. On Wednesday, June 10, John Bowdish, a
38-year old, married merchant and farmer representing Montgomery
County, proposed a resolution on behalf of his colleague, John Nellis,
a 49-year old, married lawyer and farmer also from Montgomery
County. The resolution provided:
Resolved, That a committee be appointed to consider and report on
the expediency of giving to females the right to hold and transfer,
after marriage, all property real and personal, acquired by them before or by gift, devise or bequest after marriage, and of making them
and their property liable for their debts contracted before or after marriage, and in case of the inability of the husband, liable for the support and maintenance of their families. 310
The resolution was referred to the committee on rights and privileges
of the citizen with Bowdish's consent. Fifteen days later, John Wood,
a 62-year old, married farmer from Rockland County submitted a
more comprehensive resolution which as adopted read:
Resolved, That the committee on rights and privileges of citizens of
this state enquire into the propriety and expediency of securing to
married women by Constitutional provision, the right and power to
control and manage their real and personal estate or property they
310. G. BISHOP & W. ATTREE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
1846, at 80 (1846) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP & ATTREE]; S. CROSwVELL & R. SUTTON, DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1846)
[hereinafter cited as CROSWELL & SUTTON).
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may have at the time of their marriage, or which they may afterwards be entitled to by descent, devise, bequest, contract, gift, or any
other proceedings which may entitle them to the right of property,
to empower them to make bargains and contracts for the same, to
bind them by such contracts or agreements, relating thereto, and
that the said property be liable for the debts individually contracted
by them, and also for their support and the support and maintenance
of their children, and that they may by last will and testament devise
and bequeath the same, and that laws may be passed by the legislature for the descent of such estate, or the distribution of such property in cases of intestacy, and also to secure to the husband the same
interests in his wife's estate and property, that his wife would by law
be entitled to in his under similar circumstances, and that a married
woman may before or after death of her husband, enforce a contract
or agreement311made with her during marriage, for her support and
maintenance.
On Friday, October 2, the issue of married women's property
was raised again. Ira Harris, a 43-year old lawyer representing Albany
County moved instructions to the committee to report on the following section of the Tallmadge Report.
All property of the wife owned by her at the time of her marriage
and that acquired by her afterwards by gift, devise or descent or otherwise than from her husband, shall be her separate property. Laws
shall be passed providing for the registry of the wife's separate property and more clearly defining rights thereto; as well as to property
held by her with her husband.312
Harris, a widower, desired to see section 14 passed because he anticipated that "it would be productive to domestic happiness," 313 but his
reasoning triggered a debate. Harris' opponent was Charles O'Conor,
a 42-year old lawyer representing New York County. Although never
married himself, O'Conor argued that the section, if passed, "would
be productive of domestic unhappiness."3 14 The Tallmadge Report,
of which section 14 was a part, was a report on the "rights of man."
O'Conor's view of the rights of man excluded the rights of women. 3 5
311.
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His distinction between the rights of women and those of man was
evidenced by his retort to Harris that he preferred that the Convention "devote a little [time] to the rights of men as well as the rights
316
of women."
After O'Conor's attack, Ansel Bascom moved to amend by substituting the following for the section proposed by Harris:
The contract of marriage shall not be held to vest in either of the
contracting parties, the property of the other or to create a17liability
upon either to discharge the debts or obligations of the other.
Bascom, the delegate from Seneca County was a 32-year old, married
lawyer. He insisted upon the right of a man and wife freely to contract
with regard to their property. A condition precedent to such freedom
of contract was the necessity of ending the "violent construction that
the law put upon the marriage contract, making it entirely different
and more comprehensive than the contract itself."3 18 Bascom, perhaps
in an effort to placate O'Conor, declared that his "amendment aims
to secure the rights of men too. 31 9 He argued that the "reason for
the violent construction that the law puts upon the marriage contract, by which the property of the wife is vested in the husband, is
founded upon the liability of the husband to pay her debts contracted
before marriage. .. ."2 If the amendment were passed, men would be
relieved of this constructive liability to offset the wife's new gain.2 21
After Bascom proposed his amendment, Conrad Swackhamer, a
delegate from Kings County, delivered a. long oration advocating
the rights of women. Swackhamer, a 31-year old, married mechanic,
clearly influenced by Romanism and the Enlightenment, insisted that
the oppression of women was a consequence of the fact that "we were
just emerging from a system of feudalism, oppressive to woman and degrading to men."8 22 After referring to the matrimonial condition in this
country as "a false and barbarious system transported from other countries," 23 he argued that the marriage contract made the wife's "bond316. CROSWELL
317. Id.
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age . . .as complete as that of the southern slave." 24 Contrasting this
sorry state of affairs to the status of Roman matrons after the punic
wars, Swackhamer declared:
It was then that the women of Rome took a position in society before
unknown to their sex. It was during this period that their oppressors
seemed to have discovered that they had souls, and that they possessed intelligence and power; for then they began to consult them
respecting
matters of state, and admit them to the councils of the na5
tion.32
Implied in his remarks was a preference for the civil law treatment of married women's property and status over the English feudal
common law treatment. Similar implications can be drawn from the
remarks of George W. Patterson, a married farmer representing
Chautauqua County. Patterson urged joint ownership of marital property,82 for such were the property relations of married couples under
a community property concept in jurisdictions which derived their
civil law from Germanic law. Patterson, however, believed that reform
of the laws of marital property was a job for the legislature rather
than for a constitutional convention. Arphaxed Loomis, a 48-year old,
married lawyer from Herkimer County, joined in agreement with
Patterson stating that, "this was a subject of too much difficulty and
delicacy to be put in so permanent a form as a constitutional provision. 327 This is consistent with a Romanist conception of a constitution as a brief document consisting only of general principles.
On October fifth, the rights of married women were again debated. This was the day that the Committee of Revision gave their
report on what was to be the revised constitution. As proposed, section seven read as follows:
All the property of the wife, owned by her at the time of her marriage, and that acquired by her afterwards, by gift, devise, or descent,
or otherwise than from her husband, shall be her separate property.
Laws shall be passed providing for the registry of the wife's separate
property, and more clearly defining her
rights thereto so well as to
28
property held by her with her husband.3
324. Id. at 1040.
325. Id. at 1039.
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In reality this was the Harris proposal and was again attacked by
O'Conor, who regarded this section as "more important than any
which had been adopted-perhaps than all the rest of the constitution." 329 This unmarried delegate argued that "[i]f there was anything
in our institutions that ought not to be touched by the stern hand
of the reformer, it was the sacred ordinance of marriage and the relations arising out of it. ' 330 Unlike Swackhamer, O'Conor praised the
English common law with its feudal Christian precept of the unity of
husband and wife finding it eminently suited to the American experience. He was pleased that the revolutions which had changed government here and in England left the law of married women untouched. 331 O'Conor feared that if the law of married women "were
changed and man and wife converted as it were into mere partners
• . . a most essential injury would result to the endearing relations
of married life."' 3 2 His argument was that:
A wife with a separate estate secured to her independent disposal
and management, might be a sole trader; she might rival her husband
in trade or become the partner of his rival. Diverse and opposing
interests would be likely to grow out of such relations; controversies
would arise, husband and wife would become armed against each
other to the utter destruction of the sentiments which they should
entertain towards each3 other, and to the utter subversion of true
felicity in married life.
Weaknesses in the factual basis of O'Conor's argument might be explained by his lack of marital experience. In actuality, the financial
interests of two members of the same household were almost always
one and the same whether the husband had control over the wife's
property or not. This fact was manifested by the cases litigated after
the Married Women's Property Acts were passed. Contrary to
O'Conor's prognosis, the husband and wife were almost invariably on
the same side of the lawsuit, while parties adverse to them were most
often their debtors, creditors or employers.
O'Conor was interested in preserving existing social relations, or
"manners" as he called them. He understood the social ramifications
329.
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of the proposal, acknowledging that "[a] law like that proposed was
unnecessary"33 4 for the woman from the wealthy classes. Such a woman's
family provided for special marriage settlements. O'Conor, however,
was gratified that such settlements "affected not the humble cottage,
nor any great portion of society. '335 O'Conor also understood that the
proposal would deviate from the British common law and move New
York family law in the direction of the continental civil law. He implored the convention to "look at the state of society in the nations of
continental Europe, governed by the civil law, where the estate of
the wife was kept separate, and to compare it with the beautiful and
divine simplicity of the marriage relation in England and this
state... ,,13 "After such comparison," he asked, "would any man say
that a change from these to those was desirable?' 33 7 He importuned
"all who held the married state in respect, to pause and deliberate
before they fixed permanently in the fundamental law, this new and
dangerous principle."'' 8
O'Conor was answered by Robert H. Morris, a delegate from
New York. Morris, a 42-year old, married lawyer, had served as mayor
and recorder of New York, and he was able to relate to the Convention many cases which had come to his attention while in public service. He told of females who brought property to their husbands only
to be beggared by the profligacy of the men whose duty it was to have
sustained and comforted them,mo of wives who had
worked night and day with the needle, and had not only supported
husband and family, but had laid up something against a wet daybut whose earnings had been seized and squandered by a dissolute
husband-where friends and relatives under his promises of reformation had come foreward and furnished a house for the family; but
when promises were broken, and the house stripped of everything
by the creditors of 34
the
debauchee of a husband, and his family,
0
turned into the street.

Experience working with the New York police taught Morris of the
"existence of an organized system of fortune hunting in Europe under
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
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which heiresses here were made the victims of a partition among 'nice
young men' having in view solely the property to be acquired by mar' 3 41
riage under our law.
Morris contended that the Harris proposal, if passed, would augment rather than decrease family harmony. He rejected the concept
"that the harmony of a family consisted in the man's 'pocketing all
the cash.' "342 Like O'Conor, Morris knew that some few women had
the benefit of private settlements for separate property. Rather than
restrict such settlements, in contrast to O'Conor, he wished to see this
right extended. He asked: "[W]hy could not this provision which
every prudent man made for his children, be made general-so that
the children of the ignorant or the careless may have the benefit of
it?"'' 4a "[A]s a father, anxious to secure to his own the benefit of the
little that he might leave to them,"3 44 Harris spoke in defense of his
proposal, urging as Morris had done that the proposition be made the
general rule. Harris, too, recognized that the debate concerned a
"comparison between the civil and common law," 34 5 remarking that
many had "alluded to the condition of the married state in the countries where the civil law is in operation, and where the common law
prevailed.134 6 Attempting to mitigate this point of contention Harris
argued that the proposition would merely allow more people to do
directly what a few people presently were doing indirectly. Nevertheless, he demonstrated little reverence for the common-law system
which necessitated the use of such complicated and unevenly accessible legal devices. Married women in the United States, he contended,
achieved what benefits they had despite, rather than because of, the
common law, whose principles "originated in a dark and barbarous
age."

347

Despite these efforts, the Harris proposal was rejected by a vote
of 59 to 50.348 Throughout the debate, opponents of the Harris proposal claimed that any change in the law of married woman was for
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the legislature to effect rather than for a constitutional convention
3 49
engaged in drafting a fundamental law.

B. The Passage of the 1848 New York Married Women's PropertyAct
Two years after the Convention narrowly defeated the Harris proposal, the legislature overwhelmingly passed an act to protect married
women's property. It is interesting to note that the arguments were
quite similar to those made at the Convention. Opponents in the legislature invoked arguments for the maintenance of domestic tranquility
and Anglo-American common law. France, French women, and French
civil law became focal points of their attack. These arguments were
countered by attacks on the irrational, feudal common law with its
barbarous treatment of women. Even the personal views of marriage
and the personal goals to protect the property of female relatives
advanced by the legislators were analogous to the members of the
Convention.
The story of its passage was told by George Geddes, in a letter
350
to Matilda Gage reprinted in The History of Women Suffrage.
Geddes, a state Senator in 1848 claimed to have "very distinct recollections of the whole history of this very radical measure." 35' Judge
Fine of St. Lawrence, who was the bill's originator, Geddes recalled,
was troubled by the legal options available to him and his wife.
Not himself sharing the interests of the fortune hunters as described
at the convention by Morris, Fine had tried in vain to keep the property of his wife distinct from his own. Judge Fine was described by
his colleague Geddes as a "stately man

. . .

of ...

conservative tenden-

cies." 3

2 Clearly he was not one desiring to promote the laxity of
morals predicted by delegate O'Conor.
Geddes himself supported the bill for the same reasons Harris
supported a constitutional provision. Like Harris, he had a young
daughter to whom he desired to leave his property. He had availed
himself of a trust instrument, as fathers had so long done before
him. Nevertheless, he was not satisfied that the trust would adequately
protect his daughter. Given the facts that trusts were in a tenuous legal
349. Bisop & ATTREE 1059 (remarks of Mr. Brown); cf. id. at 1042 (remarks of
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position since the Revised Statutes of 1836 and that Chancery and
Chancery judgeships were abolished in 1846, Geddes' concern was
well justified.
In his letter Geddes recalled an opponent to the bill in the
Senate. Like delegate O'Conor, this man was never married. According to Geddes, he was "a lawyer well-read in the old books, and versed
in the adjudications which had determined that husband and wife
were but one person, and the husband that person." 3 Also like
O'Conor, that Senator, according to the Geddes account, "expressed
great fears in regard to meddling with this well-settled condition of
domestic happiness," and, therefore, "made long . . . arguments to
show the ruin this law [would] work."3 54 Unlike delegate O'Conor,
however, this Senator voted for the bill in its final decision, indicating the wide support for defeudalizing property law despite inevitable
ramifications in family law.
The bill passed the Assembly with even greater ease than it
passed the Senate. Speaker of the House, Hadley, personally saw to
it that the bill passed. As Speaker, he had the power to override the
usual legislative procedures. According to Geddes, Hadley thought
the bill a good one that ought to pass. He never sent the bill to a
committee of the whole but rather sent it directly to a select committee for it to be reported complete.
Geddes, also recalled that he knew of no debates that preceded
the Act of 1848. This is further evidence that there was little opposition to this radical reform. Geddes attributed this lack of opposition to the fact that "[g]reat measures often occupy the thoughts of
men and women long before they take substantial form and become
355
things of life."
VIII. LAW REFORM IN NEW YORK-THE VICTORY OF LAW REFORM
THROUGH LEGISLATION-THE ABOLITION OF CHANCERY AND
THE MERGER OF LAW AND

EQUITY

Because married women's property before enactment of the Mar-

ried Women's Property Acts was protected by the court of Chancery,
it is important to understand the fate of Chancery itself on the eve
353. Id. at 65.
354. Id.

355. Id.
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of the passage of the Acts. Chancery, in the first half of the 19th-century,
was unpopular with law reformers who were legislative supremacists.
There was much opposition to judicial control over law reform, control exercised for centuries by English chancellors. There was, likewise, opposition to the Council of Revision composed of judges and
the governor. This council was viewed as yet another judicial interference with the prerogatives of the legislature. Moreover, the division of the judicial system into two jurisdictions with two sets of
procedures was destined to be transformed into a single modern procedural system. Since Chancery courts protected married women's property, and since Chancery was abolished by the 1846 Constitution when
no provision was made for it in article VI (the judiciary article), -the
status of the concept of married women's separate property became
tenuous. Because of this close relationship between the law of married
women's property and Chancery, it is important to become familiar
with the history of the procedural law reform movement as well as
that of the substantive law reform movement.
The distinction between law and -equity was unknown in New
Netherland where the civil law prevailed. "56 Neither, according to the
revisers of New York's Property Statutes, did feudal tenures exist
while the colony was under the Dutch government.35 The need for
a separate tribunal to correct the defects of this feudal common law
was felt when increasing wealth and land speculation brought conveyance of property into greater use, giving rise to more frequent controversies concerning trusts (their creation and execution) and other
like subjects of equity jurisprudence which the law courts lacked
jurisdiction to entertain. 58
The constitutional and political situation which set the stage
for the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts demonstrated
356. Redfield, English Colonial Polity and Judicial Administration, 1664-1776, in
I HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW YORK 35, 69 (1897) [hereinafter cited as
English Colonial Polity].
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the struggle between judicial and legislative hegemony over lawmaking. If the forces for legislative lawmaking were to triumph they
had to destroy and'replace Chancery as the modernizer of law. Therefore, the legislative reform movement could not stop with substantive revisions. Of necessity it had to revise procedural law. The procedural reform movement called for a merger of law and equity, a
merger which ultimately abolished Chancery.
Far from remaining abstract, the struggle narrowed to personalities. The villain became James Kent, chancellor from 1814 to 1823
and author of the widely read text, Commentaries on American Law.3 9
To Kent there were two great problems for early republican law: the
relationship of English common law to the law of the new republic,
and the relations among the judiciary, the legislature and the executive.3 60 Kent's solution was to receive English law into New York. He
maintained that since innovations were dangerous he would follow
the English chancellors' conceptions of equity.30 ' Kent, incident to his
functions as chancellor, enjoyed powers far beyond those of his British
counterparts. The chancellor of New York enjoyed the unique power
to sit in the court of last resort. Although he could not vote, Kent
could argue in support of his own judgment below. Another unique
power derived from his seat on the Council of Revision which had
been established by the 1777 Constitution. This council could veto
legislation. These powers reinforced his reputation as a villain and
complicated the struggle against Chancery. His opponents characterized
him as a counter-revolutionary Anglophile on a "throne of equity."
The whole idea of a chancellor, they argued, was associated with kingship. 362 Kent's opponents were the descendants of William Penn, John
Warr and the other Puritans who opposed Chancery in favor of Parliament in England.
The movement to merge law and equity was carried on at constitutional conventions. The first of these constitutional conventions
359. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 290 (1973). Friedman
pointed out that Kent's COMMENTARIES, because of its great popularity, went through 12
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met at Albany, on August 28, 1821. The Democrats dominated the
meeting.3 3 The main points of attack, according to one historian's
reading of the debates of the Convention, were: (1) the primacy of
the old judicial establishment, having abnormal political power as
vetoer of legislation through the Council of Revision; and (2) the
qualified electoral franchise erected on a basis of landed interests.36 4
These institutions were atavisms of the pre-revolutionary British
experience which Kent cherished. 36 5 The hostility toward British institutions focused on the chancellor and resulted in a call to abolish
Chancery and merge equity into the law courts. Many proposals were
made at this Convention to transfer the entire equity powers of the
chancellor to the Supreme Court. 366 These suggestions were not carried.3 67 Nevertheless, the powers of the judges were somewhat circumscribed by the new constitution which destroyed the Council of
Revision. Although the office of chancellor was not abolished, Kent's
career as chancellor was. His term of office, due to expire in a few
months when he reached the mandatory retirement age of 60, was
not extended. Moreover, the constitution authorized the legislature
to vest equity powers in the common-law judges. 68 This was the first
substantial step in the movement to merge law and equity. It was to
be an important step since it demonstrated the feasibility of the
merger. The second step was taken in 1823. That year an act was
passed authorizing the circuit judges to hold courts of equity.36 9
The circuit judges were allowed to act as vice-chancellors within their
circuits. This situation continued until the next convention to revise
the constitution was held in 1846.370
In the years between the two constitutional conventions the
movement for reform continued to grow. Some of the motivations for
reform have been recorded in the law journals of the 1830's. In 1837,
the American Jurist published an article suggesting reform in the
remedial law. 37 ' The reason for reform was to insure that "citizens,
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who are subject to the law, . ..have the power, 'to obtain right and
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it ....,',312 This
article, clearly advocating a cognizable legal system, demonstrated the
obstacle to knowability created by the distinctions between law and
equity.3 73 Under the old system, litigants had to choose the right forum
the first time or be subjected to the double costs, in time and money,
of starting over in the proper court. That is, each litigant was compelled to decide at great peril whether the common-law forms offered him an adequate remedy or not.
The example with which the author chose to demonstrate this
problem involved a recurring problem of 19th-century practitioners.
It was chosen from a contemporary textbook which cited this case as
a warning to those who were to practice law. The actual case which had
made its way into the textbook had been handled by no amateur.
Rather, the lawyer was described by the textbook as "very eminent for
his legal attainments, sound opinions and great practice. ' 374 The
eminent barrister advised his client that there was no remedy whatever against a married woman, who, having considerable separate
estate, had joined with her husband in a promissory note for £2500,
for a debt of her husband. The attorney had based his opinion on the
common-law principle that the contract of a married woman was absolutely void. He failed to advise the creditor of any remedy in equity
against her separate estate. The client later consulted an equity counselor. This second lawyer gave the client little better advice. He advised the creditor only of his equitable remedy despite the fact that
after the death of the husband, the wife had promised to pay, and,
therefore, she could have been arrested and sued at law. A bill in
Chancery was finally filed. However, because of the delays involved
in separating the jurisdictions of law and equity, a great part of the
property was dissipated, and the wife escaped to France with the remaining funds. The creditor never recovered his debt.
Thus, debtor-creditor relationships, which were an integral part
of the new commercial society, demanded an end to the common-law
rules regarding the contract of married women and the merger of law
and equity. It is no surprise that the same constitutional convention
which debated rights of married women also reorganized the judi372. Id. at 296.
373. Id. at 297.
374. Id. at 298.
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ciary. It is also consistent that the same legislature which passed a
Married Women's Property Act also passed an act to abolish the
feudal common-law forms of actions and pleadings and the distinction
between legal and equitable remedies in favor of a uniform course
of proceedings in all casesY 5
Again, in 1838 the American Jurist published an article illustrating the reasons why reform was needed. In a debate with the opponents
6f merger, 376 the author contended that one of the most compelling
reasons for merger was that:
Our laws are no longer the same; the labors of the real property
commissioners, based on the theoretical principles of Bentham,
Humphreys, and other writers, have already produced a complete
revolution in that branch of our laws, in which the conflicts between
the equity
and common law jurisdictions have been ever most con377
spicuous.
Thus, it can be seen that the author believed that the Revised Statutes,
having defeudalized the common law with regard to property law,
had succeeded in removing the need for equity, the jurisdiction
acknowledged to have made the initial inroads against the feudal common law. "Is it to be supposed, that Organic changes in the laws themselves will not render equally imperative a corresponding change
in the jurisdictions, which are their organs?" the author asked those
objecting to the merger.3 78 He answered the rhetorical question himself.
Unless these two reforms go hand in hand together, it is obvious, that
the attempt to "put new wine into old bottles;" to accommodate rules
founded on modem civilization, to the barbarous jurisdiction of the
middle ages, will be attended with the most pernicious effects ....
379
The author's hope was to insure that law making would become a science, "the science of forensic legislation. ' 38 0 The work of Bentham,
Austin and Humphreys as jurists was analogized by the author to that
of the natural scientist Herschel. 381
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The 1846 Constitution provided direction to the legislature to
appoint commissioners to revise, simplify and abridge the practice,
form and proceedings in all the courts of justice of the state. 382 In response to the steps taken at the Convention, David Dudley Field published, in January, 1847, a treatise entitled What Shall Be Done with
the Practice of the Courts? Shall it be Wholly Reformed? Questions
Addressed to Lawyers.3sS A memorial followed signed by lawyers of
the state, urging the legislature to abolish the old forms of action
and to provide for a uniform method of proceeding in all cases
whether of legal or equitable cognizance. A commission on practice
and pleading was appointed which was to become known as the Field
Commission. The code of civil procedure which was written and
enacted into law, known as the Field Code, abolished all distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. It provided one
simplified form of action for the protection of private rights and the
redress of private wrongs. 384
This movement for scientific law reform through legislation, begun under the inspiration of Bentham, Austin and Humphreys, was
to be continued by David Dudley Field who was conimissioned to
draft the new code of unified procedure. Field worked in conjunction with a committee of New York State Senators. Among the senators who served on the committee was Henry B. Stanton, 388 husband
and colleague of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, one of the women who petitioned the legislature to defeudalize and modernize the law of
married women's property. Thus, in yet another way, the women's
movement became linked to the movement for law reform through
legislation.

IX.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW REFORM
THROUGH LEGISLATION AS AGENTS FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS

Three women were agents of the movement for law reform by
legislation. These women saw that change was coming and were able

to hasten the adaptation of the legal system to already changed politi382. N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 24 (1846).
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cal, economic and social systems. The women so involved were Ernestine Potowski Rose, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Paulina Wright
386

Davis.
Ernestine Potowski was born in Piotrkow, Poland in 1810. 3 87 At

the age of 16 she had her first encounter with the law. It concerned
her property rights. Her mother had recently died leaving her an
inheritance. Her father contracted away this inheritance to a man
he had chosen to be her husband. Ernestine had no intention of performing her part of this "contract" and was angered when the man
refused to return her dowry. Although the daughter of a rabbi, who
under Jewish custom played the role of a judge, Ernestine took her
case to a civil court. The 16-year old girl argued her own case and
won.
When she was 17, Ernestine had her next legal and economic
struggle. In 1827, she left her father's house and moved to Berlin.
She soon learned that a Polish Jew could remain in Germany for only
a limited amount of time, meanwhile being forbidden to engage in
any trade or business. In Germany at this time the lawmaker was the
King. Ernestine, after petitioning the King, was granted an audience
and pled her own case. Unable to have the law struck down on its
face, she was successful in having its effects mitigated as it applied to
her. The King decreed that she would be able to stay in Germany as
long as she wished and would be able to carry on a trade or business.
Subsequently, she manufactured perfume to support herself.
She came to America in 1836 with her newly acquired husband,
William Rose. He was a jeweler and silversmith whom she met while
involved in the Owenite movement in London. That was the year
Judge Thomas Herttell, Assemblyman from New York City, introduced into the Assembly of the State of New York his groundbreaking
resolution.
Herttell had hoped to elicit public attention by this resolution
and by the introduction of a bill the following year. He was unsuccessful in eliciting the attention of many married women. Nevertheless, his activism did attract Ernestine Rose's attention.3 88 Rose, was
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no more successful in winning support for the bill than was Judge
Herttell. In a letter to Susan B. Anthony,3 89 she admitted that it was
only after much trouble that she obtained five signatures on a petition to the New York Legislature to secure for a married woman the
right to hold real estate in her own name. Both the women and the
men to whom she spoke on her quest for signatures expressed the convictions that the relations between the sexes should not be altered. In
Rose's words: "Some of the ladies said the gentlemen would laugh
at them; others that they had rights enough; and the men said that
the women had too many rights already." 390
Paulina Wright Davis' recollection of their disappointing efforts
as petitioners substantiates that of Rose. In a pamphlet 30 1 she wrote in
1871, Davis admitted: "In 1836, Mrs. Ernestine L. Rose... began lecturing . . . . She also, in the same year, sent to the Legislature of
New York a petition with five names (which cost her weary miles
of walking, and hours of talking), asking for the property rights of
392
women."
Nevertheless, Rose continued sending petitions. Moreover, she
addressed the legislature in person on five occasions between the defeat of Herttell's bill and the passage of the first New York Married
Women's Property Act in 1848.393 This reluctance of common people

to sign the petitions tends to indicate the fact that the contemporary
public shared the fear of changes in family law which were expressed
by the legislative committee in their report rejecting the petitioners'
request for the passage of a married women's property act.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, daughter of a judge and wife of a
lawyer, was a feminist social reformer. As such she was predisposed
to become an agent for the legislative movement to adjust property
law to the realities of commercial society. Stanton recounted much of
her story in her autobiography, Eighty Years and More: Reminiscences
1815-1897,394 and in the pages of The History of Women Suffrage,300
389. Letter from Ernestine Rose to Susan B. Anthony, Jan. 9, 1877, in 1 HisTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 98-100.
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the six volume work to which she was a contributing editor. Her interest in reforming laws dealing with women, she claimed, stemmed
from experiences of her childhood. 396 From an early age, she read
the laws in regard to women and sat in on client interviews of her
father, whose law office adjoined the house in which the family
lived. 39 7 Stanton understood the relationship of feudalism and married women's status. In her autobiography she wrote:
In our Scotch neighborhood many men still retained the old feudal
ideas of women and property. Fathers, at their death, would will the
bulk of their property to the eldest son, with the proviso that the
mother was to have a home with him. Hence it was not unusual for
the mother, who had brought all the property into the family, to be
made an unhappy dependent on the bounty of an uncongenial
daughter-in-law and a dissipated son. 98
There is other evidence to show that Elizabeth Stanton understood the relationship between women's emancipation and the law
reform movement. Her papers demonstrate a solid grasp of the nature
and goals of the movement. Like Jeremy Bentham, Stanton wanted
women to comprehend the law. Moreover, she called women's attention to the need for the feminist movement to be framed in con-

text of these reforms. Her father, Judge Cady, was the first one to
explain to her how judge-made laws could be reformed through legislation. He told his young daughter, who was hostile to the current
legal system, "[w]hen you are grown up . . . you must go down to
Albany and talk to the legislators . ...
[I]f you can persuade them

to pass new laws, the old ones will be a dead letter." 39 9 Elizabeth
Stanton claimed that this became the object of her life.400 In fact,
knowledge of the law and how to reform it was a goal she advocated
for all women. In "Our Young Girls," 401 one of Stanton's most
popular lectures, she argued:
[I]f the elevating, purifying influence of woman is needed anywhere, it is in our courts of justice, especially in those cases involving the interests of her own sex....
396. E.
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401. Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton (on file in the Buffalo Law Review office
and among the Elizabeth Cady Stanton papers in the Vassar College Library).
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Would not the study of Blackstone's and Kent's Commentaries
enlarge their minds and be of more practical benefit than402the magazine of fashion ... or hours everyday devoted to the needle?
In Stanton's article entitled Why Legislatures Should Make Precedents,403 this feminist showed an acute knowledge of the power of
legislatures to change law rapidly, totally and with impressive efficiency. As the New Jersey legislature had the sheer raw power to disenfranchise, by a single act, the women of New Jersey who had had
the right to vote for several years since that state's constitution was
passed, she called for all legislatures to use that same swift power to
40 4
enfranchise women.
As she recalled in her autobiography, Stanton was a friend of
1
Lord Brougham, whom she met during a visit in London in 1840.40
Lord Brougham, whose call for the defeudalization of English property
law influenced the law reform movement in New York State, was also
an abolitionist and a radical feminist. 40 6 His feminism was useful to
Stanton. In a letter to the New York Suffrage Association she quoted
Brougham as saying: "The laws for women, in both state and church,
'
are a disgrace to the civilization of the Nineteenth Century. 407
Brougham inspired other feminists as well as Stanton. He called for
a total reconstruction of the whole marriage system, believing any
attempt to amend it would prove useless. According to Brougham's
plan, this reform should be accomplished by the legislature, since
neither equity nor the common law had proved sufficient in the past.
The great charter, in establishing the supremacy of law over prerogative, provides only for justice betveen man and man; for woman
nothing is left but common law, accumulations and modifications of
original Gothic and Roman heathenism, which no amount of filtra402. Id.
403. E. Stanton, Why Legislatures Should Make Precedents, (on file in Buffalo
Law Review office and among the Elizabeth Cady Stanton papers in the Vassar College Library).
404. Id.
405. E. STANTON'S REMINISCENCES 89.

406. Id. at 89, 217-18.
407. Letter from Elizabeth Stanton to the New York Suffrage Association, (Copy
on file in the Buffalo Law Review office and among the Elizabeth Cady Stanton papers
in the Vassar College Library). A similar use of Brougham's quote was made by Stanton
in a letter to the Suffrage Convention held in Washington, D.C., in 1898, a copy of
which is on file in the Vassar College Library.
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tion through ecclesiastical courts could change into Christian laws.

They are declared unworthy
a Christian people by great jurists; still
408
they remain unchanged.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton was one of the women who planned the
first women's rights convention at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848.
She was also one of the very few women who struggled for passage
of the early Married Women's Property Acts both before the legislature and among the delegates to the 1846 Constitutional Convention.4 19 While she was accomplishing all of this, her husband, Henry
Brewster Stanton, worked with her. He accompanied her to London
where he met British reformers who were added to the list of American reformers who were already his colleagues. 410 The writings of
Henry Stanton are a valuable tool in accurately reconstructing the
true relationship among law reform, feminism and abolitionism, all
aspects of defeudalization and the rise of a commercial society.
In 1849, the year after the first New York Married Women's
Property Act was passed, Sketches of Reforms and Reformers of
Great Britain and Ireland411 by Henry B. Stanton was published. Most

likely, he, had worked on the book during th6 very years his wife
was petitioning the legislature for an act to protect married women's

property and was planning the first women's rights convention. Presumably, Elizabeth Stanton was cognizant of her husband's work and
was also acquainted with the reformers about whom he wrote. Therefore it is important to note that Henry Stanton devoted several chapters of his work to the movement for law reform and law refbrmers;

to Jeremy Bentham and Lord Brougham, Henry Stanton devoted entire chapters. He referred to Bentham as "one of the most remarkable
408. E. STANTON'S REMINISCENCES 218. This speech was quoted in a letter by
Lucretia Mott which was reprinted in Stanton's autobiography to demonstrate Mott's
radicalism. Id. at 217-18.
409. Id. at 143-54. According to Elizabeth Cady Stanton's own recollections, she
did not enter the movement for married women's property until 1840. At that time she,
Ernestine Rose and Paulina Wright Davis began a petition campaign which kept up
until the bill was passed in 1848. However, she conceded that the women's petitions were
only a part of the forces which combined to ensure the passage of this significant bill.
She also acknowledged the influence of the governor, the jurists, the Dutch aristocracy
and the forces behind the Constitutional Convention of 1846. Note that Stanton recalled
conversations with Bascom while he was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention
advocating the rights of married women. Id. at 144-45.
410. Id. at 71-91.
411. H.
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men that has appeared in our age" and as "the father of modern law
reform." 412 The author's admiring description of Bentham's work
demonstrated intimate knowledge of it. Stanton credited Bentham
for influencing Brougham413 as well as the revisers and codifiers of
America. 414 Lord Brougham's life and work, particularly his struggle
against both the feudal common law and equity, were also greatly
admired by Henry Stanton. Of Brougham, Stanton noted: "As an
advocate and a jurist, many of his speeches at the bar and opinions
on the bench will live long after the ... court of chancery cease to
oppress and vex mankind." 41 5 Brougham advocated the interests of
the manufacturing and commercial classes. Henry Stanton, aware of
this,416 praised Brougham's seven-hour speech on law reform made
to Parliament in 1828-a speech which Stanton felt "sketched the
absurdities and abuses of every branch of the common law, and detailed the amendments he proposed in its principles and admin417
istration."
Henry Stanton was very interested in the great English law reformers of whom he wrote. In 1840, during a tour of Europe with
his wife, he attended a session of Parliament in order to hear
Brougham. 418 While on that same journey he went to Edinburgh
where he had an interview with Lord Francis Jeffrey. 419 Stanton recalled that Jeffrey
took an interest in law reform and asked me a good many questions
about the New York Revised Statutes and their authors, which I
reciprocated by inquiring into the habits and studies of the strange
codifier Jeremy Betham .. .who always seemed to me to be in the
law what Dr. Franklin was in science, Dr. Johnson in literature and
Dr. Greeley in joumalism.4 0

Elizabeth Stanton shared her husband's admiration of law reformers. Her autobiography speaks of Lord Brougham and her meeting
412. Id. at 87.
413. Id. at 95.
414. Id. at 97.
415.
Chancery
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
as a
Id.
Id.
H.

at 176. Henry Stanton had a great disdain for equity and the court of
solution to the problem of law reform.
at 179.
at 181.
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with him with great respect. Moreover, her public speeches arguing
that women should know the law, an idea long advanced by the
advocates of codification and law reform, serve as further evidence
supporting the theory that as a feminist, Elizabeth Cady Stanton was
a conscious agent of the law reform movement which arose to make
the law conform to a new commercial and more civilized society and
which was destined to defeudalize the law of married women as well.

X.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CODIFICATION

MOVEMENT TO THE INAUGURATION
CENTURY WOMEN'S

OF THE

19TH

RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Elizabeth Stanton understood the significance of the 1848 Act.
In her autobiography, she related the influence the Act had on the
women's rights movement.
The same year of the [Seneca Falls] convention, the Married Women's
Property Bill, which had given rise to some discussion on women's
rights in New York, had passed the legislature. This encouraged
action on the part of women, as the reflection naturally arose
that, if the men who make the laws were ready for some onward
step, surely the women themselves should express some interest in the
42 1
legislation.
Ernestine Rose's recollection supports Stanton's analysis. Despite

meager response to her petition, Rose continued her efforts. The result, as she retold it in her letter to the editors of The History of
Women Suffrage was that "no sooner did it become legal than all the
42
women said, 'Oh! that is right! We ought always to have had that'."
Thus, the law's passage convinced women who formerly thought they
"had rights enough" to believe that perhaps they did not. 423 That
is to say, there is evidence that the women who were reluctant to
help Ernestine Rose, Paulina Davis and Elizabeth Stanton to aid
the law's passage were inspired by that very law into activism, an
activism manifested in the Seneca Falls Convention which in turn
hastened the suffrage movement. Similarly, the 1848 Act encouraged
421. E. STANTON'S REIBIUNISCENCES 150.
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women to demand amendments to this law which were to secure even
more legal rights for women. This interpretation is substantiated by
a letter of Ernestine Rose written to the Boston Investigatoron April
11, 1860. 4 She claimed that the 1848 and 1849 Married Women's
Property Acts were "a beginning and an important step, for it proved
that a law had to be altered, and that some others might need it
just as much."' 425 This was the step which launched the 19th century
feminist movement. Because of it, Rose contended, in the same letter,
"[t]he field of labor then grew wider, and .. .commenced our con-

ventions."4 6
The Act was amended in 1849, 1860, 1862 and 1896. In the years
after 1848, women's rights conventions became almost an annual
event. The Declaration of Rights and Sentiments427 of the Seneca
Falls Convention shows the concern for married women's legal status
and their right to hold property, despite the fact it was not only written after, but also was inspired by the Act passed only three months
before it was delivered. Its bill of particulars contained grievances
such as:
He has made her, if mpried, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He
had taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she
earns. He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as she can
commit many crimes with impunity, provided they be done in the
presence of her husband. In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents
and purposes, her master-the law giving him power to deprive her
of her liberty, and to administer chastisement. He has so framed the
laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of
separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be given,
as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women- the law, in all
cases, going upon the false supposition
of the supremacy of man, and
28
giving all power into his hands.

These grievances are an interesting combination of already acquired and yet to be acquired rights. By 1848 New York women had
424. Letter from Ernestine Rose to the Editor of The Boston Investigator, in the
Boston Investigator, Apr. 11, 1860, at 401, col. 4.
425. Id.
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the right to own property, but the status of other disabilities incident to the doctrine of unity remained uncertain. Yet, Elizabeth Stanton found it helpful that "the demands made at the convention were
not entirely new." 429 The Declarationshows that women were still concerned with the doctrine of unity or "civil death," and with the right
to property. The right to contract, to sue and to be sued were not
specifically granted by the 1848 Act, nor were wages secure. Under the
common-law doctrine of a husband's rights to his wife's services, property acquired in payment of services became the property of the husband. The 1848 statute specifically dealt with property received by
gift, grant, devise or bequest, leaving the question of aLmarried
woman's right to her own wages an unsettled question.
In 1853, a women's rights state convention*was held in Rochester, New York. The convention resolved to present to the Legislature certain questions:
Why should not woman's work be paid for according to the quality
of the work done, and not the sex of the worker? ...
Why should not wives, equally with husbands, be entitled to their own
earnings?...
Why should not widows, equally with widowers, become by law the
legal guardians... of their owm children? ...
On what just ground do the laws make a distinction between men
and women, in the regard to the430ownership of property, inheritance,
and the administration of estates?
Speaking at the convention, Ernestine Rose raised the question of
married women's lack of civil capacity. Matilda Gage, another speaker,
raised other legal issues not changed by the 1848 or 1849 Acts. 431 A
student of Kent and Story, Gage pointed out to the convention that:
A wife has no management in the joint earnings of herself and her
husband; they are entirely under control of the husband, who is
obliged to furnish the wife merely the common necessaries of life;
all that she receives beyond these is looked upon by the law as a
favor, and not held as her right ....

A widow is allowed the use

merely of one-third of the real estate left at the husband's death; and
429. E.
430.
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when her minor children have grown up she must surrender the personal property, even to the family Bible, and the pictures of her dear
43 2
children.

In 1854 another New York State convention was held in Albany,
the state capital. Among the resolutions presented by the Reverend
Antoinette L. Brown was one which called for an end to the "preposterous fiction of law, that in the eye of the law the husband and
wife are one person, that person being the husband . . .,43 Another
resolution called for revision of the 1848 and 1849 Acts so as to
enable married women to conduct business, to form contracts, to
sue and be sued in their own names-to receive and hold the gains
of their industry, and be liable for their own debts so far as their interests are separate from those of their husbands-to become joint
owners in the joint earnings of the partnership, so far as these interests are identified-to bear witness for or against their
husbands,
43 4
and generally to be held responsible for their own deeds.
Also resolved was:
That as acquiring property by all just and laudable means, and the
holding and devising of the same is a human right, women married
and single are entitled to this right, and all the
usages or laws which
435
withhold it from them are manifestly unjust.

These resolutions show that some property issues were still unresolved by the legislature. Feminists knew that women needed protection of their property rights to fit the needs of free women in the
new commercial society and not merely the rights of fathers to keep

their estates from falling into the hands of irresponsible sons-in-law.
The evidence is clear and convincing that feminists wanted a complete destruction of the doctrine of unity and all its incidents. 43 0 In
432. Id.
433. Id. at 593-94.
434. Id. at 594.
435. Id.
436. Although the principal concern of this article is struggle for the acheivement
of rights at private law, naturally 19th century feminists also wanted political equality
in the Enlightenment sense as expressed by Garrisonial anti-slavery. However, it may be
a fiction to distinguish between private and public rights. Marshall, in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), took for the judiciary the power to decide
questions of public law from the constitutionary grant of power to decide merely questions of private law, that is, questions arising "in law and equity" (U.S. CONST. art III,
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1854, Elizabeth Cady Stanton delivered a declaration to the Legislature of New York, adopted by the State Women's Rights Convention held at Albany. This declaration demonstrates what women still
wanted after the Acts of 1848 and 1849. Stanton, in her address before
the legislature, like Brown in her resolutions before the Convention
of 1854, was concerned with the matter of civil death.437 This fiction
was not wiped out by implication from the 1848 and 1849 Acts allowing women to hold and convey separate property. Thus, Stanton asked
for civil identity including the right to sue, to be sued, to testify against
her husband, to obtain credit, to make contracts and to carry on a
38
trade.4
The status and condition of working women also troubled Stanton. She conceded that "the wife who is so fortunate as to have in§2). Public law is

often a reflection of private law. Behind "equality of laws" is there
not the threatened violence of social power? Are not the socially powerful the people of
property?
Portalis, upon submitting the projet for the French Civil Code, noted the interaction of private and public law.
Every resolution is a conquest. .. . The private relations of men among
themselves are no longer a concern; only the political and general aim is
noticed....
If attention is fixed on the civil laws, it is less to make them more sage
or more just, than to make them more favorable to those to whom it is
necessary to give a liking for the regime which it is intended to establish ...
[G]ood civil laws . . . if they do not establish the government, they maintain it.
Cited by Franklin, The Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REv. 514, at 51415. Portalis also knew the relation between defeudalization of private law, including the
common-law status of married women, and the establishment and maintenance of a new
political state.
The marital authority is not respected, because it is by giving very great freedom to women, that there is success in introducing new forms and new manners
in the commerce of life. There is the need of overthrowing the whole system
of successions, because it is expedient to create a new order of citizens by a
new order of proprietors.
Cited id. at 515.
Abigail Adams, wife of John Adams, knew of this relationship too. She was asking
for private rights for women when she requested that her husband and the drafters of
what she expected to be a new civil code "remember the ladies." John Adams' rejection
of her request was couched in terms of fears of extending the Revolution to any greater
numbers of people-a political fear. See FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND HIS
WIFE ABIGAIL ADAMS, DURING THE REVOLUTION 149-55 (1970). For a more detailed
discussion of the revolutionary potential of a socially provocative system of private law,
see Franklin, Eighteenth Brumaire, supra.
437. Address by Elizabeth Stanton, Legislature of New York, adopted by the State
Woman's Rights Convention, Albany, New York, Feb. 14, 1854 (copy on file among the
Elizabeth Cady Stanton papers in the Vassar College Library).
438. Id. at 9-10.
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herited property, has by the new law in this state been redeemed
from her lost condition. She is no longer a legal nonentity." 439 This
result obtained because the 1848 and 1849 Acts, "if fairly construed,
will overturn the whole code relating to woman and property. The
right to property implies the right to buy and sell, to will and bequeath, and herein is the dawning of a civil existence.1 440 However,

Stanton deplored the fact that the laboring woman had no right to
the wages she earned since her services were the property of her
441
husband.
Even with the system of inheritance, Stanton was prepared to do
battle. She castigated the inequity of the doctrine of the widow's share
in only a third of the real property and half of the personal property
of her husband, even when she put in a whole life of effort.442 She
also pled passionately for the widow's right to guardianship of her
children 443 and for suffrage for women of every marital status. 444 Her
argument for the elective franchise shows the relationship of the reform in property law to the women's rights movement it precipitated.
These reforms furnished excellent arguments for demands for suffrage.
Recognizing the political usefulness, Stanton could shrewdly raise
the question:
What is property without the right to protect that property by law?
It is mockery to say a certain estate is mine, if, without my consent,
you have the right to tax me when and how you please, while I
have no voice in making the tax gatherer, the legislator or the law.
The right to property will, of necessity, compel us in due time to
the exercise of our right to the elective franchise, and then naturally
follows the right to hold office. 445
PEGGY RABmIN
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